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JUDICIAL V. CONGRESSIONAL FEDERALISM:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW
FEDERALISM DECISIONS ON MASS TORT
CASES AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION
Georgene Vairo*
Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as
sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment,
which, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was
enacted to allay lingering concerns about the extent of na-
tional power. The Amendment confirms the promise im-
plicit in the original document: "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people. "'
"These are the same people who say we need to return
power to the local level, to the individual level, and here
they are now arguing to bring this back to the Federal
Government. This is absolutely contrary to the horse that
my colleagues rode to the Congress on, the states' rights
horse. "2
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School. I
gratefully acknowledge and thank Larry Solum. His insightful comments
helped me tame, to some degree, the rather farfetched arguments I propound
here. I also acknowledge the participants at Loyola's Federalism Symposium
in February 2000 for their thoughtful questions and comments. Thanks finally
to Catherine Fisk and the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for inviting me to
participate in the Symposium.
1. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2247 (1999) (Kennedy, J.) (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. X).
2. Stephen Labaton, House Passes Bill that Would Limit Class-Action
Suits, N.Y. TImES, Sept. 24, 1999, at Al (quoting Rep. Melvin Watt, Dem.,
N.C.) (discussing his "states' rights" Republican colleagues' attempts to enact
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a remarkable series of cases, the United States Supreme Court
has redefined the relationship of the federal government to the
states.3 As a proceduralist, 4 I undertake participation in this Feder-
alism Symposium quite humbly. Other participants will expound on
the very basic constitutional implications of the Supreme Court's re-
cent federalism cases. Instead, I will focus on a more mundane, but
somewhat related and equally important, trend. As the Supreme
Court continues its campaign to end federalism as we know it, Con-
gress has taken a surprisingly antifederalist approach to federal court
jurisdiction.5
legislation that would have the effect of ousting the state courts from hearing
diversity-based class actions).
3. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (holding that Con-
gress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity in state courts); Florida Pre-
paid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999) (holding that Congress lacks Section 5 enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity in patent cases);
College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that Congress could not abrogate sovereign immunity
in Trademark Remedy Clarification Act under its Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement powers); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996) (noting that Congress lacks the power under its Article I Commerce
Clause powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal courts); Idaho
v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (holding that Ex Parte Young did
not apply in the case of submerged lands); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997) (noting that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was not an ap-
propriate exercise of Congress's Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment en-
forcement power); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act gun control legislation as exceeding
Congress's Commerce Clause powers and in violation of the Tenth Amend-
ment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 as exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause powers
and violating the Tenth Amendment).
4. Although I have taught Federal Courts and written some in the area,
see, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of
Federal Court Deference to State Proceedings, 58 FoRDHAM L. REV. 173
(1989), most of my scholarship relates to Rule 11 sanctions, the procedural as-
pects of forum selection, and mass tort resolution. I do not purport to be a con-
stitutional law scholar. Accordingly, my arguments come from the perspective
of a proceduralist rather than a constitutional law scholar.
5. See infra Part IV.
1560
FEDERALISM AND MASS TORTS
Congressional Republicans, who consider themselves to be con-
servatives and states' rights advocates, 6 have adopted and continue to
pursue legislation that seeks to reverse our long-standing tradition of
preserving the availability of state courts to those who seek remedies
for violations of traditional state law causes of action.7 For example,
the Securities Exchange Act of 19978 and the Y2K Act9 permit the
removal of state claims by granting federal courts original jurisdic-
tion for cases that traditionally could only be brought in state court
because of a lack of diversity jurisdiction. These acts also set some
of the substantive federal standards for resolving many aspects of
what otherwise would be pure state law claims. And, more dramati-
cally, Congress is now considering a class action bill that could result
in federalizing all mass tort cases and other class action litigation de-
pending on state law for their resolution.10 Congress's authority to
regulate subject matter jurisdiction in litigation in which it also posits
the rules of decisions may be unquestionable. However, in light of
the recent Supreme Court cases, Congress's attempt to do so in cases
involving purely state law claims raises significant federalism prob-
lems.11
Of course, we have always lived in a world of concurrent juris-
diction in which litigants often have the choice of state or federal
courts. Diversity cases serve as the prime, and relevant, example.
12
6. See Labaton, supra note 2.
7. I do not mean to suggest that all the proponents of the legislation that I
will discuss are states' rights conservative Republicans. Indeed, I, perhaps
better described as a "knee-jerk liberal," have been of the view for a long time
that consolidation of complex litigation in the federal courts can be an efficient
and fair means for resolving complex, multiparty, multijurisdiction litigation.
See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust,
and the Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 79
(1997) [hereinafter Georgine]; Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claim-
ants Trust, Paradigm Lost (or Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 617 (1992)
[hereinafter Paradigm]; Georgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for
More Darkness on the Subject, or a New Role for Federal Common Law?, 54
FoRDHAM L. REV. 167 (1985) [hereinafter Multi-Tort].
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb (2000).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-6617 (1999).
10. See H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999); S. 353, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999).
See infra Part W.C.
11. See infra Part IV.C.3.
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1996) (providing for federal subject matter juris-
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In that respect, the legislation I will focus upon here is simply an-
other example of Congress providing federal courts as a proper alter-
native in diversity based cases. However, as we will see, what many
members of Congress are actually seeking to do is to prevent certain
types of state law cases from being litigated in the state courts in or-
der to ensure a certain substantive outcome. To the extent that Con-
gress's subject matter jurisdiction legislation is intended to succeed
in that attempt, it is problematic.
This paper will explore these legislative developments, particu-
larly the general class action removal provisions pending before
Congress, in contrast to what the Supreme Court is doing in its
revolutionary federalism cases. 13  Of course, the cases involving
challenges to federal legislative power at the expense of the states
that the Supreme Court has focused upon are very different from the
private law cases effected by the legislation I will discuss. Purely
private cases generally do not expressly implicate the Tenth or Elev-
enth Amendment, 14 and therefore, the subject matter jurisdiction
legislation I will address is not obviously implicated directly by the
Supreme Court's recent federalism cases. Nonetheless, it is appro-
priate to examine this apparent crosscurrent. Although the Court's
decisions do not readily suggest that such legislation is unconstitu-
tional, one may wonder how far the new federalism decisions may
reach to curb legislative antifederalism subject matter jurisdiction
trends.'
5
diction in cases between citizens of different states when the amount in contro-
versy exceeds $75,000).
13. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2269-95 (1999) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (describing majority's revolutionary conception of state sovereign
immunity).
14. Of course, even that assertion is now suspect. The successful constitu-
tional challenge to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) in Brzonkala v.
Morrison, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), affd, United States v. Morrison, 120
S. Ct. 1740 (2000), was based on whether Congress's enforcement power un-
der Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment can proscribe certain kinds of pri-
vate conduct rather than state action. The Court held that it may not.
15. Moreover, as the states themselves become more involved in mass tort
litigation, as they did in the tobacco litigation and as they are now doing in the
gun and lead litigations, the Eleventh Amendment may be expressly impli-
cated. For example, in the wake of the tobacco litigation, some injured smok-
ers have sued the states for their share of the proceeds of the states' settlements
with the tobacco companies. Suits have been filed in Georgia, North Carolina,
1562
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I will focus on state claim based complex litigation generally,
and mass tort claims particularly, in exploring the divergent ap-
proaches taken by the Supreme Court on the one hand, and Congress
on the other. Such litigation, especially mass tort litigation, is a good
vehicle because, as we will see, it raises important federalism prob-
lems in and of itself. I will discuss how ironic it is, in light of the
Supreme Court's new federalism decisions, that congressional Re-
publicans are trying to channel these cases into federal court rather
than leaving them in the state courts where they arguably should be
from a federalism perspective. I will then sketch out an argument
that legislation channeling more state claim based litigation-such as
certain tort, consumer protection, fraud, or contract claims-into the
federal courts violates, at the least, the spirit of the Court's new fed-
eralism decisions. I also will argue quixotically that the legislation
may, indeed, also violate the letter of the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments as envisioned by the conservative majority of the
Court.
I will begin by providing a brief history of the resolution of
mass tort cases. Although mass tort cases are based on state tort
claims, state courts were perceived as lacking in resources or proce-
dures for resolving multiparty, multijurisdiction litigation. Thus, by
the mid-1980s, the federal courts came to be seen as the most appro-
priate place to resolve mass tort cases. Later judicial developments,
most particularly the Supreme Court's Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor16 decision, questioned the propriety of federal court class
resolution of mass tort litigation. These decisions resulted in a flight
of mass tort and similar litigation to the state courts, many of which
appear to be more hospitable to class resolution of such cases. This
flight, in turn, led to the recent subject matter jurisdiction legislation
designed to permit the return of the state class litigation to federal
courts. Once returned, Congress envisions, based on restrictive
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and West
Virginia. In another case brought in Wisconsin, the trial court dismissed the
claims against the state in violation of the Eleventh Amendment. There is also
a case pending in California. Plaintiffs hope to avoid the Eleventh Amendment
problem by filing in California state court. See Stephen Labaton, Medicaid
Smokers Seek to Gain a Share of States' Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2000,
atAl.
16. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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readings of Amchem, that the federal courts generally will refuse to
certify the proposed class actions, which, of course, greatly reduces
their settlement value to plaintiffs and their attorneys.'
7
Against this backdrop, I will examine briefly some of the juris-
dictional bills recently enacted and under consideration by Congress.
Next, I will analyze Congress's legislation through the federalism
prism articulated by the Supreme Court. I will argue that Congress's
attempt to move more state claim based litigation to the federal
courts violates federalism principles, not simply as redefined by the
Supreme Court, but also as traditionally understood. I maintain, as I
always have, that the federal courts should remain an important part,
and perhaps the ultimate part, of the resolution of mass tort and other
national scale civil litigation. 18 However, I will show that, while
only arguably unconstitutional, legislation that has the effect of strip-
ping state courts of their ability to hear class actions involving state
law claims undermines the spirit of federalism and may impair the
fair resolution of such cases.
I1. How THE FEDERAL COURTS CAME TO DOMINATE
MASS TORT LITIGATION
While important in the 1970s, mass tort cases came to dominate
the civil litigation scene in the last two decades of the last millen-
nium.19 Mass tort cases, and other complex cases based on state law
liability theories, have no inherent claim to federal court resolution.
Indeed, according to the Erie doctrine,20 the law to be applied to
such cases is state law.21 And, state courts of general jurisdiction can
and generally do resolve the vast majority of cases turning on state
17. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (di-
recting district court judge to decertify class action in hemophiliac/HIV con-
tamination litigation out of concern that certification provided plaintiff class
with undue leverage in seeking settlement).
18. See, e.g., Georgine, supra note 7; Paradigm, supra note 7; Multi-Tort,
supra note 7.
19. Asbestos, Agent Orange, breast implants, Bendectin, the Dalkon Shield,
Fen Phen, tobacco, and now gun litigation have overwhelmed state and federal
courts for the last few decades.
20. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
21. See id. at 78.
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law.22 Of course, in appropriate cases, diversity jurisdiction permits
such cases to be adjudicated in federal court. But, because mass tort
litigation, or consumer protection litigation such as the General Mo-
tors side saddle fuel tank litigation,23 is simply an aggregation of
hundreds or thousands of individual state law cases, one would think
that the preferred place for resolving such litigation would be state
courts.
2 4
State courts, however, generally lacked the means for resolving
such cases on a national basis.2 5 Instead, the federal courts increas-
ingly were looked to as the preferred forum for the aggregated reso-
lution of cases traditionally handled as individual product liability
cases in state or federal court.26  Because mass torts are
22. See Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Consti-
tutional and Practical Advantages of the State Forum Over the Federal Forum
in Mass Tort Cases, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215 (1994).
23. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 819 (3d Cir. 1995).
24. See Robert L. Rabin, Federalism and the Tort System, 50 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1, 6 (1997); Linda S. Mullenix, The Federalization of State Law: Mass
Tort Litigation and the Dilemma of Federalism, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 755, 757-
60 (1995); Weber, supra note 22; William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superi-
ority, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 599 (1999).
25. Currently, there is no legislation authorizing transfer, consolidation, and
coordination of related state and federal litigation. There have been various
proposals for more effective handling of complex litigation pending in state
and federal courts. For example, the American Law Institute has proposed a
variety of procedural solutions for dealing with such litigation, including the
following: expanded federal diversity subject matter jurisdiction to provide a
federal forum alternative in a broader range of cases; reverse removal to permit
federal cases to be handled in the state courts where appropriate; expanded
powers for a new Complex Litigation Panel which would take the place of the
Multidistrict Litigation Panel; federalizing choice of law rules; and new rules
pertaining to personal jurisdiction and preclusion. See AMERICAN LAW INST.,
COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS
(1994). Although these proposals raise interesting federalism issues, they, at
the least, envision an important role for state courts. Moreover, in recent years,
federal district and state court judges have worked closely and cooperatively
on a voluntary basis in a number of complex cases to achieve a high degree of
efficiency. See William W Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action:
Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689
(1992). In addition, Congress has considered various forms of "Multiparty-
Multijurisdiction" legislation over the last decade. For a discussion of the
problems raised by this legislation, see Mullenix, supra note 24.
26. For amplification of many of the issues raised by the use of class ac-
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national-and sometimes international-in scope, it made sense to
try to use the federal court system to resolve such cases.2 7 Most par-
ties, particularly defendants beleaguered at the least by the huge
transaction costs presented when defending thousands of suits, often
ultimately desire some form of global, efficient, and fair resolution of
a mass tort. The federal courts appear to have the best tools for
achieving that goal.
First, Congress has provided the federal judicial system with the
Multidistrict Litigation statute.28 The statute allows the Multidistrict
Litigation Panel to transfer related federal cases to one district court
for pretrial purposes.29 In addition, the bankruptcy laws provide sev-
eral tools to assist a defendant corporation in consolidating the cases
against it.3 ° Filing under Chapter 11 provides the company with an
automatic stay of all litigation against it, including all mass tort cases
filed against it in state and federal court.31 Moreover, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334, which vests the federal district courts with subject matter ju-
risdiction over cases "related to" a bankruptcy case, may be used to
support removal of state cases and, ultimately, their aggregated
treatment in a federal court.32 Indeed, codefendants in some cases
may be able to channel cases against them away from the state courts
to the federal court handling the bankruptcy case.
33
tions in mass tort cases, see Georgine, supra note 7.
27. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 514 (1996).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994).
29. See id.; 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
ch. 112 (3d ed. 1999).
30. See Barbara J. Houser, Chapter 11 as a Mass Tort Solution, 31 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 451 (1998).
31. See22U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994). Section 1334 provides for original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under title 11 (the Bankruptcy code) and
further provides in relevant part: "[T]he district courts shall have original but
not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings ... arising in or related to
cases under title 11." Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (1993) (allowing con-
solidation); In re Dow Coming Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 486-87 (6th Cir. 1996)
(finding "related to" jurisdiction).
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Section 1334 "related to" jurisdiction has
been used in a number of mass tort cases to effect consolidation. Perhaps the
broadest use of such jurisdiction occurred in the silicone breast implant litiga-
tion. There, after Dow Coming sought Chapter 11 protection, other manufac-
turers and suppliers of silicone breast implants, as well as Dow Coming's cor-
1566
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There are judicial tools as well. The Supreme Court by way of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 permits representative litigation
in appropriate cases.34 Finally, in some cases nearing federal court
settlement, the federal courts will issue injunctions against state
porate parents, Dow Chemical Co. and Coming Inc., who were codefendants in
the lawsuits against Dow Coming, sought to have the state cases filed against
them removed to federal court. They consolidated with the Dow Coming
Chapter 11 proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (providing federal juris-
diction) and 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (allowing consolidation). See In re Dow
Coming Corp., 86 F.3d at 486-87. The district court rejected the attempt, but
the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. See id. at 485. Citing the "primary
goal [of] establish[ing] a mechanism for resolving the claims at issue in the
most fair and equitable manner possible," the Sixth Circuit adopted an expan-
sive definition of "related to" jurisdiction. Id. at 487, 489. The Sixth Circuit
found that the tort claims against the nondebtors were sufficiently related to the
tort claims against Dow Coming, which were stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)(1) (1994), because the former could give rise to contribution or indem-
nification claims among the nondebtors which could have an impact on the
debtor's estate. See In re Dow Corning, 86 F.3d at 493-94. Thus, according to
the court, the "'unusual circumstances' necessary to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1334
"related to" jurisdiction were present. Id. at 493 (quoting A.H. Robins Co. v.
Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1986)). The court also found that 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) granted the district court handling the Dow Coming bank-
ruptcy the power to transfer all the cases to itself. See id. at 496-97. The Sixth
Circuit relied heavily on the decision of the Fourth Circuit in the Dalkon Shield
litigation. See id.
On remand, the district court, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2), held
that the actions against the nondebtors were subject to mandatory abstention.
See In re Dow Coming Corp., No. 95-CV-72397-DT, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16754, at *20-21 (E.D. Mich. July 30, 1996). Section 1334(c)(2) provides for
mandatory abstention "if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudi-
cated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2).
The Sixth Circuit granted mandamus in favor of the nondebtors, holding that
an individualized determination must be made in each case to determine the
impact of the case on the debtor's estate. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 113
F.3d 565, 569, 572 (6th Cir. 1997). In addition, the Sixth Circuit found that
discretionary abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) was also "wholly inap-
propriate" given the court's prior acknowledgment of the "significant impact
that our resolution of these issues will have on the future course of [bank-
ruptcy] litigation." Id. at 571. Thus, the filing of bankruptcy, together with the
broad reach of the "related to" jurisdictional provision and the transfer power,
provides a very potent tool for aggregation and global resolution. The Fourth
Circuit had held that there was "related to" jurisdiction over claims against
doctors and A.H. Robins's insurance company. See A.H. Robins Co., 788 F.2d
at 1011.
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
June 2000] 1567
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 33:1559
court litigation which raise or may raise the same claims as those in
federal court.
35
A. Early Reluctance
Despite the existence of these tools, federal court resolution of
mass tort cases was unthinkable until the 1966 amendments to Rule
23.36 It was then that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure first ex-
pressly provided for compensatory damage classes under Rule
23(b)(3). Although the advisory committee had in mind cases where
an individual's economic stake was so small that one-on-one
35. See Georgene M. Vairo, Problems in Federal Subject Matter Jurisdic-
tion: Supplemental Jurisdiction; Removal; Preemption, Abstention and Diver-
sity, reprinted in ALI-ABA NEW DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 47-58 (1996).
36. Prior to the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, the class action rule had an
equity orientation and thus was not conceived as being available in a common
law tort case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1937
Adoption; FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1966 Amendment.
However, practice with the rule showed that the rule was fraught with difficul-
ties. As the 1966 advisory committee's note explains:
The categories of class actions in the original rule were defined in
terms of the abstract nature of the rights involved: the so-called "true"
category was defined as involving "joint, common, or secondary
rights"; the "hybrid" category, as involving "several" rights related to
"specific property"; the "spurious" category, as involving "several"
rights affected by a common question and related to common relief. It
was thought that the definitions accurately described the situations
amenable to the class-suit device, and also would indicate the proper
extent of the judgment in each category, which would in turn help to
determine the res judicata effect of the judgment if questioned in a
later action. Thus the judgments in "true" and "hybrid" class actions
would extend to the class (although in somewhat different ways); the
judgment in a "spurious" class action would extend only to the parties
including intervenors.
In practice the terms "joint," "common," etc., which were used
as the basis of the Rule 23 classification proved obscure and uncertain.
The courts had considerable difficulty with these terms.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1966 Amendment (citations
omitted).
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litigation would be impracticable, 37 the idea that it might be appro-
priate to use class actions to resolve damages cases was born.
However, the advisory committee clearly did not envision the
routine use of class actions in mass tort litigation. First, mass torts
were "as rare as hen's teeth" in the 1960s. 38 Second, the advisory
committee note stated that mass accident cases "ordinarily" would
not be "appropriate" for class action treatment.39 This part of the ad-
visory committee's note was invoked time and again in the late
1970s and early 1980s as the federal courts denied class action
treatment in a variety of mass tort cases. For example, in the Dalkon
Shield litigation,40 the MDL Panel transferred the federal Dalkon
Shield cases to the district court of Kansas for pretrial proceedings
under 28 U.S.C. § 1407.41 By the end of 1979, with thousands of
cases pending nationwide, the courts remanded many of the MDL
37. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1966 Amendment;
see also Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV.
356, 391 (1967) ("the interest [in controlling a litigation] may be no more than
theoretic where the individual stake is so small as to make a separate action
impracticable"); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338-40
(1980) (finding that plaintiffs have an economic interest in appealing denial of
class certification in order to shift the costs of the litigation onto the class; de-
nying them standing to appeal would reduce the effectiveness of the class ac-
tion as a device for obtaining relief for a multiplicity of small claims).
38. Mark Herrmann, From Saccharin to Breast Implants: Mass Torts, Then
and Now, 26 LITIGATION 50, 52 (1999).
39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note to 1966
Amendment. The advisory committee's note to the 1966 revision of Rule
23(b)(3) states:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordi-
narily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that
significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses
to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different
ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class
action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately
tried.
Id.
40. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.,
526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982). See
RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD
BANKRUPTCY 1-22 (1991).
41. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 406 F. Supp. 540, 541 (J.P.M.L. 1975).
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cases to their respective transferee courts for trial.42 The district
court in California certified a nationwide class under Rule 23(b)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the issue of punitive dam-
ages, and a California class under Rule 23(b)(3) on the issues of li-
ability and compensatory damages. 43 The Ninth Circuit, however,
reversed,44 citing the 1966 advisory committee's note.45
Attempts to certify classes or to push the limits of the multidis-
trict litigation procedure fared no better in the early phase of the as-
bestos litigation. For example, in 1974 in Yandle v. PPG Industries,
Inc.,46 a district court in Texas refused to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class
on the issue of liability. More surprising than the courts' reluctance
to certify mass tort class actions during this period was the MDL
Panel's refusal to invoke the pretrial transfer provision of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 in the asbestos litigation.47 In 1977, the MDL Panel declined
to transfer the pending asbestos cases because it was not convinced
that such cases raised sufficient common questions of fact.48 At the
time, 103 cases were pending in nineteen different district courts.
4 9
The Panel denied transfer again in 1980, 1985, 1986, and 1987.50
B. The Need for Federal Judicial Pragmatism in the Face of
Congressional Inaction
As the number of mass tort cases increased, the federal courts'
philosophy changed dramatically. By 1991, the number of asbestos
cases in the federal courts reached over 26,000. 5 1 At that time the
42. See Paradigm, supra note 7, at 625; see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 610
F. Supp. 1099, 1100 (J.P.M.L. 1985) (discussing pending Dalkon Shield ac-
tions).
43. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab.
Litig., 526 F. Supp. at 896.
44. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab.
Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 857 (9th Cir. 1982).
45. See id. at 851-52.
46. 65 F.R.D. 566, 570-72 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
47. See In re Asbestos Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906 (J.P.M.L. 1977).
48. See id. at 910.
49. See id. at 907.
50. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 417
(J.P.M.L. 1991) (discussing history of asbestos litigation).
51. See id. at 416.
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MDL Panel, citing the changed circumstances, decided that transfer
of the asbestos cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 was appropriate.52 The
MDL Panel was, no doubt, persuaded to change its mind because of
the practical considerations of handling and resolving through set-
tlement or trial thousands of pending cases. Later, paralleling the
greater willingness to transfer cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1407,5 dis-
trict courts, often with approval from the courts of appeals, certified
mass tort class actions of various kinds. Some of the most notorious
of those cases involved asbestos,54 Agent Orange,55 the Dalkon
Shield,56 breast implants, 57 Fen Phen,58 and tobacco. 59 Of course not
all attempts at certification in the district courts were successful.
60
52. See id. at 417-18.
53. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 749-50
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Some 600 separate cases have been sent to this district from
all over the country with an estimated fifteen thousand named plaintiffs."); In
re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 844 F. Supp.
1553 (J.P.M.L. 1994) (173 actions); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litig., MDL 721, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17332 (D.P.R. Dec. 3, 1988) (275
actions).
54. See In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996) (certifying man-
datory class in Texas asbestos litigation), cert. granted and judgment vacated,
521 U.S. 1114, 1115 (1997) (judgment vacated and case remanded to Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d
996 (3d Cir. 1986); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex.
1985), aft'd, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming district court order certi-
fying class in Texas asbestos litigation).
55. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1987) (affirming district court order affirming Rule 23(b)(3) class in Agent Or-
ange litigation).
56. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming
mandatory class action against Dalkon Shield product liability insurer in liti-
gation related to A.H. Robins Chapter 11 proceeding).
57. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp.
1469 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (certifying class against breast implant manufacturers).
58. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 98-20626, 1999 U.S.
LEXIS 13228 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1999) (certifying Rule 23(b)(3) class in Fen
Phen litigation).
59. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995)
(certifying nationwide Rule 23(b)(3) class in tobacco litigation on addiction
theory), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); Broin v. Phillip Morris Cos., 641
So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
60. See, e.g., In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726 (2d Cir.
1993) (reversing mandatory class certification in asbestos litigation insurance
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There was no question, however, that during this time period district
courts were willing to use class actions as vehicles for managing or
settling mass torts cases, and that the courts of appeals would often
affirm. For example, "despite misgivings," the Third Circuit af-
firmed a Rule 23(b)(3) class in the asbestos property damage case
and commented that "the trend has been for courts to be more recep-
tive to use of the class action in mass tort litigation." 61 Similarly, in
the Texas asbestos litigation, the district court certified a class on the
central issue of the "state of the art" defense.62 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.63 Summarizing the new approach to
thinking about mass torts, the Fifth Circuit stated:
The courts are now being forced to rethink the alternatives
and priorities by the current volume of litigation and more
frequent mass disasters .... If Congress leaves us to our
own devices, we may be forced to abandon repetitive hear-
ings and arguments for each claimant's attorney to the ex-
tent enjoyed by the profession in the past. Be that as time
will tell, the decision at hand is driven in one direction by
all the circumstances. Judge Parker's plan is clearly supe-
rior to the alternative of repeating, hundreds of times over,
the litigation of the state of the art issues with, as that expe-
rienced judge says, "days of the same witnesses, exhibits
dispute); it re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo. 1982), va-
cated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982) (vacating mandatory class certification in
accident case). Perhaps the result in these cases may be seen as demonstrating
judicial reluctance to use mandatory, limited fund class action theories in mass
tort cases, especially where the federal court class certification would have the
practical effect of enjoining related state court proceedings. See It re Federal
Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1182 (8th Cir. 1982). The district court certi-
fied the class in part to prevent competing actions which might frustrate the
federal court's attempts at settlement. The Eighth Circuit reversed because the
mandatory class had the effect of an injunction and because the Anti-Injunction
Act forbids the federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings unless
one of three narrow exceptions, none of which the court found to be present in
the litigation, were satisfied. See id. at 1181-82. However, by the mid-1990s,
courts of appeals would also overturn class certifications in damages class ac-
tions under Rule 23(b)(3). See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295
(1999) (overturning mandatory class settlement in asbestos litigation).
61. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1009 (citations omitted).
62. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
63. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 471-75 (5th Cir.
1986).
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and issues from trial to trial."
Necessity moves us to change and invent.
64
Similar efficiency considerations motivated the decision to cer-
tify a class action in the Agent Orange litigation. Plaintiffs, Vietnam
War veterans and members of their families, claimed to have suf-
fered damages as a result of the veterans' exposure to herbicides
produced by the defendants.65 Judge Weinstein decided to enter an
order certifying a damages class for all issues under Rule 23(b)(3)
and for the issue of punitive damages under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).
66
Judge Weinstein's analysis is important because, like the asbestos
decisions just discussed, he invoked a policy argument favoring set-
tlement as his guide in applying Rule 23.67 He stated:
Finally, the court may not ignore the real world of dispute
resolution. As already noted, a classwide finding of causa-
tion may serve to resolve the claims of individual members,
in a way that determinations in individual cases would not,
by enhancing the possibility of settlement among the parties
and with the federal government.
68
The court of appeals later affirmed Judge Weinstein's Rule
23(b)(3) settlement class.
69
C. Federal Court Sponsorship of Global Resolution
Explicit in Judge Weinstein's Agent Orange opinion was the
notion that certifying the class would facilitate settlement and result
in a fairer distribution of settlement funds.70 Implicit was his view
that the only place that such a resolution could be obtained was in a
federal court class action after an MDL transfer. Given the magni-
tude of the case, a federal global settlement appeared to be the only
64. Id. at 473 (citations omitted).
65. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 720
(E.D.N.Y. 1983).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 720-21.
68. Id. at 723.
69. See In re "'Agent Orange", 818 F.2d at 166-67. Because it affirmed the
settlement class, the Second Circuit did not need to address the limited fund
class.
70. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. at 723.
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way to achieve a number of salutary goals: (1) to avoid swamping
the state and federal courts with years of repetitive litigation, (2) to
avoid a depletion of the defendant's assets by the huge transaction
costs presented by mass tort litigation, and (3) to insure that all
plaintiffs, not just those at the head of the litigation line, would re-
ceive some compensation for their alleged injuries.
Later, in the Dalkon Shield litigation, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit similarly cited the need to achieve a global settle-
ment and, accordingly, affirmed a mandatory settlement class in
connection with the A.H. Robins Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization
under the bankruptcy laws.71 By 1989, when the case was decided,
the court cited academic commentary 72 along with the "[r]ecent court
decisions [that] have also spoken approvingly of the class certifica-
tion of mass-tort actions for purposes of settlement" to support its
decision.73 According to the court, affirming the settlement class
was essential to the confirmation and consummation of the reorgani-
zation plan.
All parties accepted the A.H. Robins plan of reorganization, to-
gether with the mandatory settlement class, because it achieved
global peace. Representatives of the claimant group signed on be-
cause of the prospect of receiving full compensation for their clients'
injuries. All defendants in the Dalkon Shield cases, including A.H.
Robins, the Chapter 11 debtor and manufacturer of the product; its
product liability insurer Aetna; doctors and other health care provid-
ers who were responsible for the insertion or removal of the product;
and others supported the plan because it immunized them all from
further litigation over the Dalkon Shield.
74
71. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 752 (4th Cir. 1989).
72. See id. at 738.
73. Id.
74. A creditor has no right to choose which of two funds will pay his claim.
The bankruptcy court has the power to order a creditor who has two
funds to satisfy his debt to resort to the fund that will not defeat other
creditors. Here, the carefully designed reorganization of Robins, in
conjunction with the settlement in Breland, provided for satisfaction
of the class B claimants. However, some chose to opt-out of the set-
tlement in order to pursue recovery for their injuries from Aetna or
from medical providers for malpractice. It is essential to the reorgani-
zation that these opt-out plaintiffs either resort to the source of funds
provided for them in the Plan and Breland settlement or not be per-
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A quote from the Third Circuit's asbestos property damage class
action similarly demonstrates why the federal courts came to be seen
as the best place to resolve mass tort cases:
Concentration of individual damage suits in one forum
can lead to formidable problems, but the realities of litiga-
tion should not be overlooked in theoretical musings. Most
tort cases settle, and the preliminary maneuverings in liti-
gation today are designed as much, if not more, for settle-
ment purposes than for trial. Settlements of class actions
often result in savings for all concerned.75
All this authority was obviously of great importance to the fed-
eral district court judges who continued to be confronted with new
and old mass torts. A slew of class actions were certified without the
angst that accompanied earlier cases. For example, Judge Sam
Pointer approved a settlement class in the Breast Implant litigation
after the MDL Panel transferred all the federal breast implant cases
to him.76 A very controversial 77 settlement class was approved by
mitted to interfere with the reorganization and thus with all the other
creditors.
in re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 701-02 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Columbia
Bank For Coops. v. Lee, 368 F.2d 934, 939 (4th Cir. 1966); IV Minor's Insti-
tutes 1248 (1883)).
75. A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 739 (quoting In re School Asbestos Litig., 789
F.2d 996, 1009 (3d Cir. 1986)).
76. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-
10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (ap-
proving settlement in breast implant class action litigation); see also discussion
infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text. The class in the Breast Implant case
technically fell apart, due in part to the extraordinarily large number of claim-
ants who indicated their desire to be part of the settlement. See In re Dow
Coming Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 1996). This led the major defendant,
Dow Coming, to file for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. See id.
Nonetheless, in October 1995, Judge Pointer approved a substitute settlement
plan proposed by the remaining defendants that would pay $5000 to $500,000
per claim, depending upon a woman's medical condition. See Henry Wein-
stein, New Terms Offered in Breast Implant Cases, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, at
Dl. The original settlement agreement offered payments of $100,000 to $1.4
million per claim. See id. That settlement collapsed after too many women
applied for the $4.25 billion in projected benefits. See id. More than a third of
the over 100,000 women who filed claims against silicone breast implant
manufacturers have accepted these reduced settlements. However, thousands
of other claimants rejected the plan. Many plaintiffs say they are receiving
more in individually negotiated settlements. See id. Nonetheless, claims are
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the district court in the asbestos multidistrict litigation.78 In addition,
a class action in which tobacco plaintiffs asserted the then novel ad-
diction theory was approved by the district court in Louisiana.79 Un-
til some of these classes, notably the tobacco and asbestos classes,
were vacated, the federal courts continued to be viewed as the pri-
mary forum for the resolution of mass tort cases.
80
D. Insuring the Primacy of Federal Court Resolution
Before looking at the reversal of these cases, however, we must
consider another tool that resulted in the primacy of the federal
courts over state courts for the resolution of mass tort cases: the All-
Writs Act.8 1  As a preliminary matter, the federal Anti-Injunction
Act, ironically for our purposes, embodies Congress's intent that
federal courts not interfere with ongoing state litigation. The Act
provides "[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction
to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments."
83
being paid pursuant to a successor plan of compensation offered by several
manufacturers of silicone, and a bankruptcy court has approved a $3 billion
settlement of the Dow Coming cases. See In re Dow Coming Corp., No. 95-
20512, 1999 WL 1398601 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 21, 1999).
77. An amazing number of law review articles and law review symposia
have been devoted to the analysis of the settlement class in Georgine v.
Amchem Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), vacated, 83 F.3d 610
(3d Cir. 1996). For example, a 425 page symposium in the Cornell Law Re-
view was devoted largely to ethical and other issues the Georgine class action
generated. See Symposium, Mass Torts: Serving up Just Desserts, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995). A Westlaw search of the Law Journal library
reveals that over 150 law review articles discuss, to some degree, the Georgine
settlement class.
78. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 336.
79. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 560-61 (E.D.
La. 1995), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
80. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997);
Castano, 84 F.3d at 752 (reversing and remanding with instructions that the
district court dismiss the complaint); Georgine, 83 F.3d at 635 (vacating as-
bestos settlement class).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
83. Id.
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The Anti-Injunction Act's exceptions have been narrowly con-
strued to effectuate its purpose: non-interference with state court
proceedings.84 Often, federal courts seeking to terminate a dispute
evaded the strictures or at least spirit of the Anti-Injunction Act by
invoking the All-Writs Act.85 The All-Writs Act provides "[t]he Su-
preme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue
All-Writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdic-
tions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 
86
The Supreme Court, in United States v. New York Telephone
Co., set forth a broad construction of the All-Writs Act.87 There, the
Court upheld the use of the Act to compel a nonparty to comply with
an order.88 The Court noted:
This Court has repeatedly recognized the power of a federal
court to issue such commands under the All Writs Act as
may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent
the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exer-
cise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained: "This statute has
served since its inclusion, in substance, in the original Judi-
ciary Act as a 'legislatively approved source of procedural
instruments designed to achieve "the rational ends of
law."M15
Indeed, "[u]nless appropriately confined by Congress,
a federal court may avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids
in the performance of its duties, when the use of such his-
toric aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve the
ends ofjustice entrusted to it."
89
An important aspect of the All-Writs Act is that it permits fed-
eral courts to enter orders affecting nonparties. The New York
84. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
86. Id. Cases exploring the meaning of "necessary or appropriate in aid of
their respective jurisdictions" are collected in FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384
U.S. 597, 603-04 (1966).
87. 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977).
88. See id. at 174.
89. Id. at 172-73 (respectively quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299
(1969) (quoting Price v. Johnson, 344 U.S. 266, 282 (1948)) and Adams v.
United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942)).
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Telephone Court explains:
The power conferred by the Act extends, under appropri-
ate circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to the
original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position
to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the
proper administration of justice, and encompasses even
those who have not taken any affirmative action to hinder
justice.
90
Several recent cases show how the All-Writs Act was used by
federal courts to facilitate global settlements. Perhaps the "grand-
daddy" of such use is In re Baldwin.91 While not solely a state
claim-based case, the principles it established have been invoked in
complex state claim-based litigation including mass tort and con-
sumer protection cases. In re Baldwin involved consolidated multi-
district class actions against broker-dealers who sold securities in
bankrupt corporations. 92 The Multidistrict Litigation Panel consoli-
dated proceedings of more than 100 federal securities lawsuits in
class actions in the Southern District of New York.93 Plaintiffs as-
serted claims under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 against twenty-six broker-dealers and related in-
dividuals.94 Many of the plaintiffs also raised pendent state law
claims, such as consumer protection actions under statutes providing
private rights of recovery.
95
For two years, the district court coordinated settlement talks
among the parties. 96 Negotiations proved successful as to eighteen
of the twenty-six broker-dealer defendants, providing for payment of
approximately $140 million to the plaintiffs in exchange for a release
of all the plaintiffs' federal claims against the settling defendants, as
well as any claims available to each plaintiff under relevant state
90. Id. at 174 (citing Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States,
773 F. Supp. 1, 6 (E.D. Mo. 1967); Board of Educ. v. York, 429 F.2d 66
(1970); United States v. Mottie, 196 F. 586 (N.D. Ill. 1912); Field v. United
States, 193 F.2d 92, 95-96 (1950)).
91. 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985).
92. See id.
93. See id. at 331.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
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laws.97  Only about fifty individual plaintiffs objected to this
settlement. For the purpose of ruling on these settlements, the dis-
trict court provisionally approved class status.
98
The representatives of forty states in the National Association of
Attorneys General (NAAG), on hearing of the proposed settlements,
concluded that the proposal did not adequately compensate plaintiffs
for their federal and state law claims, and that the defendants' actions
may have violated state regulatory and criminal laws.99 Nonetheless,
the district court preliminarily approved the settlement and scheduled
a hearing on its fairness. 100 Meanwhile, between the time when
some parties signed the stipulations of settlement and the year's end,
ten states issued subpoenas or other requests for information from
various defendants. 1 1  The states sought to enforce state laws
authorizing them in their representative capacities to seek restitution
and monetary damages from the defendants. 10 2 The recovery was to
be paid over to the states' citizens who were plaintiffs in the consoli-
dated class actions before Judge Brieant. 10 3 In addition, some states
sought to pursue other state remedies, "including prospective injunc-
tive relief and enforcement of state criminal and regulatory laws de-
signed to guard against repetition of the conduct forming the basis of
the consolidated federal actions."
10 4
In late January of 1985, an unsuccessful meeting occurred be-
tween certain state representatives and the defendants.105 The states
requested a higher settlement figure, and in return offered to termi-
nate all proposed state administrative proceedings and civil litigation
against the defendants. 10 6 In opposition to the allegedly inadequate
settlements, twenty-two states, including about half of the appellant
states, submitted an amicus brief.1 7
97. See id.
98. See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 105 F.R.D. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
99. See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 332 (2d Cir. 1985).
100. See id.; In re Baldwin, 105 F.R.D. at 485.
101. See In re Baldwin, 770 F.2d at 332.
102. See id. at 332-33.
103. See id. at 333.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
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In mid-February, the State of New York gave several defendants
notice of its intent to bring a suit seeking restitution for New York
citizens. 0 8 These defendants sought to enjoin the imminent actions
in New York. 10 9 Judge Brieant granted the injunction, stating that
the injunction was necessary "in aid of preserving [the court's] juris-
diction" pursuant to the All-Writs Act and Rule 23(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 10 The court found that state court suits
were likely to impair the court's jurisdiction because the federal
court settlement negotiations would be frustrated by the existence of
competitive litigation.11' The court was also concerned that
the existence of actions in state court would jeopardize its
ability to rule on the settlements, would substantially in-
crease the cost of litigation, would create a risk of conflict-
ing results, and would prevent the plaintiffs from benefiting
from any settlement already negotiated or from reaching a
new and improved settlement in the federal court."
12
The Second Circuit affirmed the injunction order. 1 13 The Anti-
Injunction Act was technically inapplicable because the injunction
issued before any suits were commenced in state court." 4 The cir-
cuit court explained:
When a federal court has jurisdiction over its case in
chief, as did the district court here, the All-Writs Act grants
it ancillary jurisdiction to issue writs "necessary or appro-
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)).
111. See id.
112. Id. However, recognizing that the states had an interest in enforcing
their laws, the court stated that it was to be
"absolutely clear that the injunction will not extend to the enforcement
of the criminal law against anybody who may be deemed to have vio-
lated it, and it will not extend to a request of a state court for prospec-
tive injunctive relief as to any business practice on the part of any de-
fendant."
Id. The court stated that if it decided to deny class action status, it would
modify the injunction and allow the plaintiffs to bring actions on behalf of
nonparty class members. See id.
113. See id. at 342.
114. See id. at 335 (relying on Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2
(1965)).
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priate in aid of' that jurisdiction.!1 5 This provision permits
a district court to enjoin actions in state court where neces-
sary to prevent relitigation of an existing federal judgment,
notwithstanding the fact that the parties to the original ac-
tion could invoke res judicata in state courts against any
subsequent suit brought on the same matters.11 6 Even be-
fore a federal judgment is reached, however, the preserva-
tion of the federal court's jurisdiction or authority over an
ongoing matter may justify an injunction against actions in
state court. Such "federal injunctive relief may be neces-
sary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a fed-
eral court's consideration or disposition of a case as to seri-
ously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to
decide that case."
'"17
The circuit court noted, however, that the "mere existence of a
parallel lawsuit in state court that seeks to adjudicate the same in per-
sonam cause of action does not in itself provide sufficient grounds
for an injunction against a state action in favor of a pending federal
action. ' 1 Nonetheless, in Baldwin, the court found the district
court's findings that the injunction was necessary to preserve its ju-
risdiction and protect its judgments sufficient to justify the issuance
of the injunction under the All-Writs Act.1 19 At the time the district
court issued the injunction, eighteen of the twenty-six defendants had
reached stipulated settlements that the court provisionally approved
and were awaiting final court approval, and the remaining eight de-
fendants were continuing settlement negotiations. 120  The Second
115. Id. (quoting All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982)).
116. Id. (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 335 (quoting Atlantic Coast, 398 U.S. at 295 (Anti-Injunction
Act)). See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332, 1334-35
(5th Cir. 1981) (upholding an injunction, issued by a federal judge presiding
over multidistrict litigation, against actions by the same plaintiffs in state
court); cf James v. Bellotti, 733 F.2d 989, 994 (1st Cir. 1984) (indicating that
the existence of a provisionally-approved settlement would justify a protective
injunction against state court suits brought by the same parties).
118. In re Baldwin, 770 F.2d at 336 (citing Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp.,
433 U.S. 623, 642 (1977) ("We have never viewed parallel in personam ac-
tions as interfering with the jurisdiction of either court.")).
119. See id. at 336, 338.
120. See id. at 336.
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Circuit concluded that the injunction was "necessary or appropriate
in aid of' the court's jurisdiction because "the potential for an on-
slaught of state actions posed more than a risk of inconvenience or
duplicative litigation; rather, such a development threatened to 'seri-
ously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority' to approve
settlements in the multidistrict litigation."']
2 1
The court continued:
The success of any federal settlement was dependent on the
parties' ability to agree to the release of any and all related
civil claims the plaintiffs had against the settling defendants
based on the same facts. If states or others could deriva-
tively assert the same claims on behalf of the same class or
members of it, there could be no certainty about the finality
of any federal settlement. Any substantial risk of this pros-
pect would threaten all of the settlement efforts by the dis-
trict court and destroy the utility of the multidistrict forum
otherwise ideally suited to resolving such broad claims. To
the extent that the impending state court suits were vexa-
tious and harassing, our interest in preserving federalism
and comity with the state courts is not significantly dis-
turbed by the issuance of injunctive relief...
... In effect, unlike the situation in the Kline v. Burke
Construction Co. line of cases, the district court had before
it a class action proceeding so far advanced that it was the
virtual equivalent of a res over which the district judge re-
quired full control....
... Although the question is closer as to the application
of the injunction to the eight defendants who have not yet
settled, we cannot find that the injunction was erroneous as
to them. Given the extensive involvement of the district
court in settlement negotiations to date and in the manage-
ment of this substantial class action, we perceive a major
threat to the federal court's ability to manage and resolve
the actions against the remaining defendants should the
states be free to harass the defendants through state court
actions designed to influence the defendants' choices in the
121. Id. (quoting Atlantic Coast, 398 U.S. at 295).
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federal litigation. So long as there is a substantially signifi-
cant prospect that these eight defendants will settle in the
reasonably near future, we conclude that the injunction en-
tered by the district court is not improper. If, however, at
some point in the continued progress of the actions against
the remaining eight defendants it should appear that prompt
settlement was no longer likely, we anticipate that upon ap-
plication the injunction against parallel actions by the states
might be lifted; in that event the situation would fall within
the Burke v. Kline Construction Co. rule that in personam
proceedings in state court cannot be enjoined merely be-
cause they are duplicative of actions being heard in federal
court. That situation, however, does not presently exist.
12 2
A more glowing endorsement of the power of the federal courts to
resolve complex litigation would be hard to find.
Indeed, borrowing from the Baldwin analysis, in the pre-
Amchem days, federal courts used the All-Writs Act to enjoin state
litigation that would thwart the global class resolution of mass tort
and other state claim-based complex litigation. For example, in the
asbestos litigation, the Third Circuit affirmed a district court order
preliminarily enjoining absent members of the plaintiff class, in-
cluding future class claimants, from prosecuting separate state court
actions. 12 3 The court held that the injunction was appropriate as nec-
essary in aid of jurisdiction under the Anti-Injunction Act and the
All-Writs Act.12 4 Settlement of the federal class action was immi-
nent, and the plaintiffs later would have the opportunity to opt out
pursuant to the class action.'2 5 A key reason for upholding the in-
junction was the fact that the state actions sought to challenge the
propriety of the federal class action, thereby implicating the "in aid
of jurisdiction" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act and the All-
Writs Act.
126
122. Id. at 337-38.
123. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993).
124. See id. at 204.
125. See id. at 203-04.
126. See id. For similar reasons, the Fifth Circuit affinied the use of injunc-
tions in an antitrust case in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation,
659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981). Key to the court's affirmance was the fact that
state court actions were initiated for the purpose of challenging and derailing a
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Similarly, the Ninth Circuit used the All-Writs Act in a con-
sumer protection case. In Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,127 the defective
latch litigation, the court found that it is proper to use the All-Writs
Act to temporarily enjoin state court litigation pending the final ap-
proval of a class action settlement. 12 8 And the Seventh Circuit has
affirmed the use of an injunction under the All-Writs Act in the HIV
hemophilia case to prevent attorneys from suing in state courts to en-
force contingency fee agreements that were inconsistent with the
federal settlement decree.
129
Courts have also used the All-Writs Act to effect removal of
state cases to federal court. For example, the Agent Orange court
used the All-Writs Act to remove parallel state court proceedings to
prevent them from frustrating the federal settlement of the litiga-
tion.130 In that case, two groups of veterans and their families
brought actions in state court asserting tort claims against chemical
companies which manufactured the defoliant Agent Orange.
1 3 1
Plaintiffs alleged that injuries they sustained did not manifest them-
selves or were not discovered until after the settlement date in prior
federal class action suit involving Agent Orange. 132 The cases were
removed to federal court, which remanded claims of two civilian
plaintiffs, but denied a motion to remand brought by veteran plain-
tiffs and their family members. 133 The district court then dismissed
their claims as barred by a prior settlement of federal class action and
an order enjoining future suits by class members.
134
The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to remand,
relying on the All-Writs Act as the basis for permitting removal.
135
federal class action settlement. See id. at 1335; see also White v. National
Football League, 41 F.3d 402, 409 (8th Cir. 1994) (approving settlement
agreement in complex antitrust class action lawsuit and enjoining related ac-
tions in state or federal court).
127. 150 F.3d 1011 (9thCir. 1998).
128. See id. at 1025.
129. See In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 159 F.3d
1016 (7th Cir. 1998).
130. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir.
1993).
131. See id. at 1428, 1430.
132. See id. at 1430.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 1428.
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The Second Circuit found that a district court, in exceptional circum-
stances, may use its All-Writs authority to remove an otherwise
unremovable state court case in order to "effectuate and prevent the
frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of juris-
diction otherwise obtained."' 136 The court noted that "[i]f Agent Or-
ange victims were allowed to maintain separate actions in state court,
the deleterious effect on the Agent Orange I settlement mechanism
would be substantial."'137 "The parties to that settlement implicitly
recognized this when they agreed that all future suits by class mem-
bers would be permanently barred.'
138
The circuit court explained that a state court properly addressing
a victim's tort claim would first need to decide the scope of the
Agent Orange class action and settlement.' 39 The federal district
court which approved the settlement, and entered the judgment en-
forcing it, was best situated to make such a determination. 140 Ac-
cordingly, removal was "an appropriate use of federal judicial
power" under the All-Writs Act.'
41
The court warned, however:
[W]e are not unmindful of the fact that the All-Writs Act is
not a jurisdictional blank check which district courts may
use whenever they deem it advisable. "Although that Act
empowers federal courts to fashion extraordinary remedies
when the need arises, it does not authorize them to issue ad
hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory procedures
appears inconvenient or less appropriate." Given the "ex-
ceptional circumstances" surrounding the instant case, issu-
ance was a proper exercise of judicial discretion. The dis-
trict court was not determining simply the preclusive effect
of a prior final judgment on claims or issues expected to be
raised in subsequent collateral proceedings; it was enforc-
ing an explicit, ongoing order against relitigation of matters
136. Id. at 1431 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,
172 (1977)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Id.
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it already had decided, and guarding the integrity of its
rulings in complex multidistrict litigation over which it had
retained jurisdiction. 
142
The Second Circuit rejected plaintiffs argument that removal
violated the Anti-Injunction Act. Rather, the court found removal
necessary to protect or effectuate the district court's Agent Orange I
judgment. 43 In Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., the court held that
"the relitigation exception [in the statute] was designed to permit a
federal court to prevent state litigation of an issue that previously
was presented to and decided by the federal court."'144 The district
court clearly determined the central issue of class membership raised
in the state court actions, whether persons who had yet to manifest
injury were class members.1
4 5
There is, however, some debate over whether it is appropriate to
use the All-Writs Act to remove state court cases. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit has noted that the All-Writs Act may permit removal, but only in
extraordinary cases.1 46 The court, following the analysis of the Su-
preme Court in Rivet v. Regions Bank that an otherwise non-
removable case may not be removed on the theory that it is precluded
by a prior federal judgment, held that the case before it was not re-
movable.' 47 The Tenth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's ap-
proach as well. 148 Moreover, it appears that the federal courts may
not have the power to use the All-Writs Act to effect removal unless
they have retained jurisdiction over a case in which it has secured a
judgment. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently vacated an Eighth
142. Id. at 1431 (citations omitted) (quoting Pennsylvania Bureau of Correc-
tion v. United States Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985)).
143. See id.
144. 486 U.S. 140, 147 (1988).
145. See Agent Orange, 996 F.2d at 1433.
146. See Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1379 (11th Cir.
1998).
147. Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 478 (1998).
148. See Hillman v. Webley, 115 F.3d 1461, 1469 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding
that the All-Writs Act does not provide an independent basis for a district court
to acquire jurisdiction over a separate case pending in state court). On the
other hand, the Seventh Circuit, citing Agent Orange, endorsed the use of the
All-Writs Act to remove and enjoin state court litigation in order to enforce its
ongoing orders. See In re VMS Sec. Litig., 103 F.3d 1317, 1323-26 (7th Cir.
1996).
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Circuit judgment that the All-Writs Act can be used as a basis for
removing an action to federal court. 149 The Court limited the use of
the All-Writs Act in light of Rivet. In Rivet, the case turned on
whether the district court retained jurisdiction in the settlement order,
ultimately holding it improper to remove under 28 U.S.C. 1441(b).1
50
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, the federal
courts have recently moved away from permitting themselves to be
the primary forum for resolving mass tort and other state claim based
complex litigation. The Supreme Court in Amchem, as we will see,
circumscribed the use of Rule 23 as a settlement tool. In addition, a
recent Third Circuit decision in a consumer protection case, the GM
side saddle fuel tank litigation, provides an example of how the fed-
eral courts are showing state courts increasing deference in such
cases.
15 1
Ill. THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY REJECTS ITS PARAMOUNT ROLE
The courts of appeals decisions on class actions and the All-
Writs Act of the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s signaled the receptivity
of federal courts as the primary forum for the resolution of mass torts
and other state claim based complex litigation. Although the use of
this device, particularly the settlement class, became more frequent,
its use remained highly controversial. Thus, in a series of cases,
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court vacated class certifications
in a variety of mass tort contexts. 152  In addition, the federal
149. See NAACP v. Metropolitan Council, 522 U.S. 1145 (1998), vacated,
125 F.3d 1171 (Sth Cir. 1997).
150. See Rivet, 522 U.S. at 472.
151. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998).
152. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996)
(reversing and remanding district court order certifying nationwide cigarette
litigation class action); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.
1996) (remanding to the district court with directions to decertify the asbestos
settlement class); In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996)
(granting petitions for writ of mandamus and directing district court judge to
decertify the plaintiff class in penile implant litigation); In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Grady v.
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 516 U.S. 867 (1995) (directing district court judge
to decertify class action in hemophiliac/HIV contamination litigation).
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courts began to shy away from using the All-Writs Act to protect the
primacy of federal jurisdiction in resolving such cases.
A. The Shibboleth of Legalized Blackmail Returns
Judge Weinstein was motivated to certify the Agent Orange
class action discussed above to help achieve a settlement of a mass
tort litigation. 153  However, one reason courts and commentators
historically thought it appropriate to reject class actions in which the
class seeks money damages was the idea that once a class is certified,
plaintiffs have an unfair bargaining advantage.154 A recent mass tort
example of this argument is Judge Posner's opinion in In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc.,15 5 the HIV hemophiliac litigation. Over 300
lawsuits, involving some 400 plaintiffs, were filed in state and fed-
eral courts seeking to impose tort liability on the defendants for the
transmission of HIV to hemophiliacs in blood solids manufactured
by the defendants. 156 The federal cases were transferred by the MDL
Panel to the Northern District of Illinois. 157 One of these cases be-
came the subject of the class action.
Plaintiffs advanced a novel theory of tort liability. They
claimed:
before anyone had heard of AIDS or HIV, it was known
that Hepatitis B, [often] a lethal disease ... could be trans-
mitted either through blood transfusions or through injec-
tion of blood solids. The plaintiffs argue[d] that due care
with respect to the risk of infection with Hepatitis B re-
quired the defendants to take measures to purge that virus
153. See supra Part II.B.
154. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Lumbard, J., dissenting) ("The appropriate action for this Court is to affirm
the district court and put an end to this Frankenstein monster posing as a class
action."), rev'd, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Judge Friendly called settlements in-
duced by a small probability of an immense judgment in a class action "black-
mail settlements." HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL
VIEW 120 (1973). But see Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and
Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem ", 92 HARV. L.
REV. 664, 679-82 (1978-79) (arguing that serious abuses died out by the mid-
1970s).
155. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
156. See id. at 1296.
157. See id.
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from their blood solids .... 158
Such measures would have protected hemophiliacs "not only against
Hepatitis B but also . . . as the plaintiffs put it 'serendipitously,'
against HIV."' 159
It was not feasible to certify a class action for all aspects of the
case, largely because the differences in the dates of infection alone
raised predominance problems.160  Nevertheless, the district court
found that particular issues, such as the novel "serendipidy" theory,
could be adjudicated through special verdicts on a classwide basis
under Rule 23(c)(4)(A).16 1 Defendants sought review of the district
court's interlocutory order by writ of mandamus. 162 Although the
Seventh Circuit commended the district judge for his experiment
with an innovative procedure for streamlining the adjudication,
Judge Posner, writing for the majority, found that the "plan so far ex-
ceeds the permissible bounds of discretion in the management of
federal litigation as to compel us to intervene and order decertifica-
tion."'
63
According to Judge Posner, the sheer magnitude of the risk to
which the class action, in contrast to the individual pending or likely
actions, exposes defendants justified immediate review. Rather than
face plaintiffs in the 300 or so cases filed, the defendants would face
a universe of over 5000 class members. The defendants had already
prevailed in twelve of the first thirteen cases tried. Even if the de-
fendants were to lose or settle, they would be faced with limited li-
ability of probably no more than $125 million. With class certifica-
tion, potential liability of $25 billion loomed, and with it bankruptcy.
Judge Posner was concerned that with this potential liability, the de-
fendants "may not wish to roll these dice," and they would be under
intense pressure to settle.
164
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 1296-97.
161. See id. at 1297.
162. See id. at 1294-95. The amendment to FED. R. Civ. PROC. 23(f), per-
mitting interlocutory review of class certifications decisions, was not effective
at the time. Accordingly, the only vehicle for seeking immediate review was a
writ of mandamus.
163. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1297.
164. Id. at 1298 (citations omitted). Ironically, the defendants settled the
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Of course, Judge Weinstein would say: "Exactly!" Class certi-
fication might result in a global settlement, thereby promoting the
twin goals of compensating the claimants and preventing the further
waste of defendant, plaintiff, or judicial resources on the litigation.
While the legalized blackmail aspect of Judge Posner's opinion is, no
doubt, a practical motivation for Congress in trying to catapult more
class actions into the federal court where they are less likely to be
certified, there is a more important, Erie federalism-based aspect to
Judge Posner's opinion.
165
The Seventh Circuit also justified vacating the district court or-
der on the ground that the Erie doctrine requires the federal courts to
apply the law that each of the transferor states would have applied.
166
Accordingly, class treatment would be unmanageable even on the
novel tort theory issue proposed to be treated as a classwide issue by
the district court.1 6 7 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit cited state law dif-
ferences as a justification for vacating the national class certification
in the Castano cigarette litigation. The Supreme Court, in Amchem,
also cited this concern, as we will see below. This concern, together
with the new reading of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments by the
Supreme Court reinvigorates the federalism prong of the Erie doc-
trine, as I will demonstrate in Part IV.C, below.
16 8
B. The Supreme Court Rejects the Primacy of
Federal Class Action Resolution
While Judge Posner worried about improper leverage of plain-
tiffs vis-A-vis defendants, many commentators and courts began to
question whether abuses and ethical lapses had permeated the use of
the class action procedure to the detriment of class members. 169 For
hemophiliac HIV litigation for $640 million, a rather staggering sum if Judge
Posner is correct about the merits of the litigation. See Thomas M. Burton,
Makers of Blood Products Agree to Offer $640 Million to Settle Cases Tied to
AIDS, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1996, at B6; In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate
Blood Prods. Litig., 159 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 1998).
165. For a discussion of the federalism aspects of the Erie doctrine, see notes
293-301 and accompanying text.
166. See Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1300 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
167. See id. at 1302.
168. See infra Part IV.C.3.
169. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass
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example, the Third Circuit reversed a so-called "coupon settlement"
in the General Motors side saddle fuel tank litigation.17 Judge
Becker, writing for the unanimous panel, found that the settlement
did not meet the test of fairness under Rule 23 because the plaintiff
class members' individual recoveries were intolerably low in the face
of huge attorneys' fees for the class lawyers.1 71 Indeed, the Third
Circuit questioned whether settlement classes were appropriate at
all.172 Judge Becker returned to this theme a year later in the MDL
asbestos litigation, again vacating a settlement class. 173  The Su-
preme Court, by a six to two vote, affirmed.
174
The Supreme Court quite clearly signaled its distaste for the
possibly collusive conduct of counsel for the opposing parties that
may lead to the use of settlement classes in mass tort cases.' 75 In that
respect, the majority opinion is of the same cloth as Judge Posner's
and Judge Becker's. At the same time, however, the Court rejected
the Third Circuit's opinion that settlement classes must meet the
same criteria for certification as if the case were to be tried.' 76 The
Court's opinion is a technical parsing of Rule 23 that elevates the
importance of state law when resolving cases in federal court and
rejects the primacy of federal courts in resolving mass tort cases.
Tort Class Action, 95 CoLuM. L. REv. 1343 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Class
Wars]; Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v.
Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045 (1995); John A. Siliciano,
Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 990 (1995).
170. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 819 (3d Cir. 1995).
171. See id. at 803, 822.
172. See id. at 818.
173. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
174. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). Justice
Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. See id. at 597. Justice Breyer
wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Stevens joined. See id. at 628.
Justice O'Connor took no part in the case. See id. Justice Breyer's dissent was
based on his view that the extensive fairness hearing conducted by the district
court warranted a more deferential degree ofjudicial review. See id. at 633-34.
This observation then led to his policy-based rationale that if ever there was a
case that warranted, indeed compelled, class settlement, the protracted asbestos
litigation which has swamped state and federal courts for decades was it. See
id. at 630-32.
175. See id. at 600, 618, 623.
176. See id. at 597, 618.
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As discussed above, most of the thousands of asbestos cases
pending throughout the federal district courts were transferred by the
MDL Panel to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.177 Attorneys for
plaintiffs and defendants formed separate steering committees 178 and
began settlement negotiations. 79 Negotiations focused not only on
the pending claims that had been transferred, but also on settling all
future asbestos claims that might be filed. 180 Indeed, the Center for
Claims Resolution (CCR)-the defendants' negotiating arm-made
clear that it would not settle the individual pending claims which had
been transferred by the MDL order-the so-called "inventory
claims" of the plaintiffs' attorneys who were co-chairing the Steering
Committee-unless the settlement also provided protection from the
filing of future asbestos claims.' 81 Eventually, CCR and the plain-
tiffs' attorneys reached an agreement whereby the inventory claims
and the future claims would be settled. The Supreme Court made
clear that the recoveries negotiated for the inventory claimants were
more generous than those that the future claimants would receive.18
2
CCR, together with the plaintiffs' lawyers, marched to the district
court with a class action complaint, an answer, a proposed settlement
order, and a joint motion for the conditional certification of a
177. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 422-
24 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
178. Complex litigation, such as mass tort cases, involve numerous parties
on the plaintiffs' side and often on the defendants' side as well. "Traditional
procedures in which all papers and documents are served on all attorneys, and
each attorney files motions, presents arguments, and conducts witness exami-
nations, may result in waste of time and money, in confusion and indirection,
and in unnecessary burden on the court." FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR, MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD 26 (1995). A solution to the problem is the
judicial appointment of lead or liaison counsel or steering committees com-
posed of representative counsel for the parties. The court appointing such
counsel generally will apprise them of their duties, and they are charged with
insuring that all attorneys involved are apprised of the proceedings. See id. at
26-28.
179. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598.
180. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 266 (E.D. Pa.
1994) ("The primary purpose of the settlement talks in the consolidated MDL
litigation was to craft a national settlement that would provide an alternative
resolution mechanism for asbestos claims," including claims that might be
filed in the future.).
181. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 600.
182. See id. at 604, 636 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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settlement class which would settle all future claims.1 83 No class
certification was sought for the settlement of the inventory claims.
The district court, after extensive fairness hearings under Rule 23(e),
approved the settlement as fair and not collusive. 18 4 The Third Cir-
cuit vacated the class certification and the Supreme Court af-
firmed.'85
The Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing the 1966
amendments to Rule 23, noting that Rule 23(b)(3) damages classes
183. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
184. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 319-25, 337. The district court held an 18
day fairness hearing under Rule 23(e), at which dozens of witnesses testified to
the ethical dilemmas of the settlement and its fairness to the class:
Counsel for the Settling Parties, several lawyers representing various
Objectors, and counsel for various Amici participated at the fairness
hearing. Under the direction of the Court, the Objectors closely coor-
dinated their activities throughout the fairness proceedings.
Because of the complexity of the issues involved, and to give all
interested parties a full and fair opportunity to present their views, the
fairness hearing was extensive and protracted, involving the testimony
of some twenty-nine witnesses (live or by deposition) during 18 hear-
ing days over a period of over five weeks. The Court heard testimony
from participants in the settlement negotiations, several representative
plaintiffs, two high-ranking officers of the CCR, medical experts, fi-
nancial experts, legal ethics experts, and representative asbestos plain-
tiffs' attorneys. Numerous exhibits were also submitted. The sub-
stance of the testimony covered, among other things: the decades-
long history of asbestos litigation in the United States; the details of
the handling of asbestos litigation in the current tort system; the nego-
tiation and operation of the proposed settlement and various objections
to certain of its provisions; the competence and adequacy of Class
Counsel; the medical conditions caused by exposure to asbestos and
the reasonableness of the medical criteria set forth in the settlement;
the ability of the CCR defendants to meet their financial obligations
under the Stipulation through insurance proceeds or otherwise; and the
negotiation and operation of settlements reached between Class Coun-
sel and the CCR defendants to settle in the present tort system the in-
ventory of pending claims of clients represented by Class Counsel and
their affiliated law firms.
In May, 1994, this Court received voluminous post-hearing
submissions from the Settling Parties, Objectors and Amici. On May
23, 1994, the Court heard day-long final oral arguments on the fair-
ness of and objections to the proposed settlement.
Id. at 260-61.
185. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628.
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were thought to be the "most adventuresome" of the innovations
adopted that year.186 Furthermore, the Court quotes from the famous
1966 advisory committee's note which warned that "ordinarily [class
actions are] not appropriate" in such cases. 187 Nonetheless, the Court
reviewed with apparent approval the more recent trend in favor of
class certification generally, and settlement classes in particular. 
188
Unlike the Third Circuit, the Court found that settlement classes are
appropriate in some cases.' 89 According to the Supreme Court, in-
stead of looking at whether all the requirements under Rule 23(a) 190
and the special requirements of predominance of common questions
and superiority under Rule 23(b)(3) are met as if the case would be
tried, the district court is required to consider the settlement in de-
termining whether the class can be certified. 191
The Court, however, warns that district courts must scrutinize
such classes carefully. In rejecting the proposed class action settle-
ment, the Court seemed troubled by the lower federal courts' grow-
ing role as the primary forum for boldly resolving mass tort and other
complex, state law based cases. For example, to meet the common-
ality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), the Court said that it is not suffi-
cient to rely solely on the class members' claimed shared interest in
186. Id. at 614 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, The Class Action, A Prefatory
Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 497,497 (1969)).
187. Id. at 625 ("'[M]ass accident' cases are likely to present 'significant
questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability,... af-
fecting the individuals in different ways.' And the Committee advised that
such cases are 'ordinarily not appropriate' for class treatment.") (citations
omitted).
188. See id. at 617.
In the decades since the 1966 revision of Rule 23, class action
practice has become ever more "adventuresome" as a means of coping
with claims too numerous to secure their "just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination" one by one. The development reflects concerns
about the efficient use of court resources and the conservation of funds
to compensate claimants who do not line up early in a litigation queue.
Among current applications of Rule 23(b)(3), the "settlement
only" class has become a stock device.
Id. at 617-18 (citations omitted).
189. See id.
190. These requirements include numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(3).
191. See id.; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 616-19, 625 n.20.
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the fairness of the settlement or their desire for prompt and efficient
compensation. 192 Second, the Court's reference to the "sprawling"
nature of the class suggests its uneasiness with a nationwide class of
hundreds of thousands, if not millions of claimants. 193 Specifically,
the Court agreed with the Third Circuit that because the class mem-
bers were exposed to asbestos at different times, for different lengths
of time, and under different circumstances, the predominance of the
common questions requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) was not satisfied.
194
Moreover, differences in state law exacerbated these disparities. 
195
Third, the Supreme Court, like the Third Circuit, expressed
grave concern about the fairness of the settlement itself because of
what it viewed as the serious conflicts of interest of the attorneys rep-
resenting the class. 196 Allocation decisions were made by the class
lawyers and defendants, as between inventory plaintiffs and future
plaintiffs, and as between earlier future plaintiffs and later ones,
without specific regard to the needs of each group. Thus, the ade-
quacy of the representation element of Rule 23(a)(4) went unsatis-
fied.
Finally, the Court rejected the idea that federal courts ought to
be the primary forum for resolving mass tort litigation, even when an
unarguably efficient and fair means for compensating the victims of
mass torts is proposed:
The argument is sensibly made that a nationwide admin-
istrative claims processing regime would provide the most
secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of
asbestos exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted
such a solution. And Rule 23, which must be interpreted
with fidelity to the Rules Enabling Act and applied with the
interests of absent class members in close view, cannot
carry the large load CCR, class counsel, and the District
Court heaped upon it. As this case exemplifies, the rule-
192. See Arnchem, 521 U.S. at 623.
193. See id. at 624.
194. See id. at 623-24.
195. See id. at 624; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,
823 (1985) (noting that constitutional limitations on choice of law apply in na-
tionwide class actions).
196. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625.
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makers' prescriptions for class actions may be endangered
by "those who embrace [Rule 23] too enthusiastically
just as [they are by] those who approach [the Rule] with
distaste."'
197
And so, although federal court settlement classes are permitted,
the Supreme Court has posed serious obstacles to the use of nation-
wide federal class actions to resolve state claim based litigation. The
Court seems to suggest that the use of Rule 23(c)(4)(B) subclasses,
but with independent counsel for all named representatives, could
have ameliorated its concerns about adequacy of representation.
198
One can only imagine, however, how the Supreme Court would view
a proposed nationwide settlement with the multiple numbers of sub-
classes needed to account for all measures of plaintiffs and state law.
It is an easy bet that the Court would still use words such as
"sprawling" and the concept of the federal courts overstepping their
judicial bounds in rejecting any such proposed settlement.
C. The Aftermath
There is no question that the economic realities of mass tort
cases both in terms of the size of compensation ftnds and attorneys'
fees, are huge.199 After Amchem, attorneys seeking to settle mass tort
cases on an aggregated basis through a class action took two basic
approaches. Some worked harder at trying to craft classes and sub-
classes that respond to the concerns about the predominance of
common questions and adequacy of representation addressed by the
Supreme Court.20 0  Many used statewide, rather than nationwide,
197. Id. at 628-29 (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 508 (5th ed. 1994) (footnote omitted)).
198. See id. at 625.
199. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 169, at 1347-49; Bruce L. Hay,
Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 479, 479-80 (1996-97); Myron Levin, Battling Big Tobacco
Earns Lawyers Big Fees, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1997, at A10. See generally
Christopher P. Lu, Procedural Solutions to the Attorney's Fee Problem in
Complex Litigation, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 41 (1992) (discussing attorneys' fees
problem and potential remedial solutions in, among other cases, class action
suits with resulting common funds).
200. See, e.g., In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. Accufix Atrial "J" Leads
Prods. Liab. Action, 172 F.R.D. 271 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (recertifying, after
making detailed Amchem findings, nationwide class, with subclasses, on plain-
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class actions to help alleviate concerns over the application of state
law. Other attorneys abandoned the federal courts entirely and
sought to certify settlement classes in state courts where the rules on
certification are perceived to be more liberal. 201 The flight to state
courts approach appeared to be the more successful.
In the wake of Amchem, some federal courts decertified classes
that they previously had certified,20 2 or refused to certify classes al-
together.20 3 Attorneys had already begun to abandon federal courts
before Amchem, as the courts of appeals began to reject class actions.
Amchem simply accelerated this trend.20 4 While some state courts
tiffs' medical monitoring, negligence, and strict products liability claims in
pacemaker litigation); Fanning v. Acromed Corp., 176 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Pa.
1997) (certifying a settlement class and enjoining competing state court actions
pursuant to the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651).
201. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 137 (2dCir. 1998).
202. See, e.g., Walker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226, 230-33 (S.D.
W. Va. 1997) (citing what it believed to be the Supreme Court's "less than
enthusiastic" endorsement of settlement classes, the court rejected a settlement
class in a smoking case in which settlement had previously been approved).
203. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., No. C-1-94-126, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12960 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 4, 1997) (citing Amchem, the court rejected
proposed settlement class in context of radiation exposure claims); Barnes v.
American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (decertifying state-
wide class in tobacco litigation for trial purposes); Smith v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (denying statewide litiga-
tion class for medical monitoring purposes); see also Reed v. Phillip Morris,
Inc., No. 96-5070, 1997 WL 538921 (D.C. Super. Aug. 18, 1997) (denying
class certification in tobacco litigation).
204. Various federal appeals courts vacated classes certified by federal dis-
trict courts. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir.
1996) (reversing district court order certifying nationwide cigarette litigation
class action); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996)
(reversing district court order certifying asbestos settlement class action); In re
American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (vacating the district
court's order certifying penile prostheses class action); In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court order certi-
fying class action in hemophiliac/HIV contamination litigation); 3B JAMES
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.01-.87 (2d ed.
1996). In the wake of these opinions, plaintiffs' attorneys began increasingly
to file class actions in state courts. See Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive
Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 595, 602 (1997)
("The current phase in this saga recognizes the recent chilly reception of mass
tort class actions in federal courts, and has changed the focus to state courts,
either for national or statewide classes."); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Class Action
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are taking the relatively strict view outlined in Amchem and by the
federal courts of appeals, 20 5 some state courts appear to be more re-
ceptive to class certification in mass tort or similar cases.2 6 Other
state courts appear to be feeling their way. For example, New York
courts have certified and decertified classes in connection with the
tobacco litigation.
207
State courts are free to interpret their class actions rules as they
see fit, so long as those interpretations do not run afoul of constitu-
tional precepts. The Maryland state trial court opinion involving to-
bacco and health class claims is an example of the more receptive
state court approach. The court certified a litigation class without
Trends and Developments after Amchem and Ortiz, E28 ALI-ABA 617, 647
(1999); John C. Coffee, Jr., After the High Court Decision in Amchem Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Windsor, Can A Class Action Ever be Certified Only for the Pur-
pose of Settlement?, NAT'L L.J., July 21, 1997, at B4 [hereinafter Coffee, High
Court]; Brian Anderson, Will Supreme Court Ruling Ebb the Class Action
Tide?, 12 WASH. LEGAL FOUND. LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Sept. 12, 1997).
205. See, e.g., Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 703 So. 2d 542 (La. 1997)
(denying certification of class in pollution emission case). More recently, in
Spitzfaden v. Dow Corning Corp., No. 95-2578, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16787
(E.D. La. Nov. 8, 1995), a Louisiana state court trial judge in a case involving
breast implants decertified a class that had been tried as a class for liability
purposes. Class members will be required to prove specific causation and
damages in individual lawsuits. See Judge Refuses to Reconsider Order on
Breast Implants, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 5, 1998; Court Bars 1,800 From
Breast Implant Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1998, at A12 (reporting that Louisi-
ana appeals court affirmed trial judge).
206. See also In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods.
Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing certification of settlement
class in GM side saddle fuel tank litigation in Louisiana state court); Dunk v.
Ford Motor Co., 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483 (1996) (certifying
settlement class in defective car/coupon case); McFadden v. Staley, 687 So. 2d
357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (certifying litigation class in food poisoning
case); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996); Cox v. Shell Oil Co., No. Civ-A 18844, 1995 WIL 775363 (Tenn. Ch.
Nov. 17, 1995) (certifying national settlement class in polybutylene plumbing
system case). See, e.g., Comerwood Healthcare, Inc. v. Estate of Herron, 683
N.E.2d 1322 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming damages class action); Broin v.
Phillip Morris Cos., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (settling during
trial a secondhand smoke case brought by flight attendants for $300 million
payable to medical research fund).
207. See Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 668 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Sup. Ct. 1997),
rev'd, 677 N.Y.S.2d 515 (App. Div. 1998); Geiger v. American Tobacco Co.,
696 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (characterizing the class action issue as
"rather simple").
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raising any of the concerns discussed by the Supreme Court in
Amchem. 20 8 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), in or-
der for a mass tort damages class to be certified, the federal district
court must find that common questions predominate and that the
class action is the superior means for resolving the dispute.20 9 Many
federal cases are not certified because the courts find that in a mass
tort case, a la Amchem, questions of liability specific to class mem-
bers swamp any common questions. Factual considerations such as
timing of exposure to the allegedly defective product, place and du-
ration of exposure, alternative causation, and extent of injury are im-
portant in every mass tort case. These individual questions may, in
the view of many federal courts, dwarf any common question, such
as whether a particular product can be proved to cause the alleged
injuries in the first place. It would follow that resolution of the
common question may not, unless it is resolved in favor of the de-
fendant, materially advance the overall resolution of the mass tort
and that individual trials on the specific causation issues will be re-
quired in any event. Accordingly, a federal court may decide class
certification is not the superior means for resolving the mass tort.
The Maryland trial court, on the other hand, looked to the alleged
"pattern of fraudulent activities" by the defendants to justify class
certification, even though federal courts have rejected similar class
certifications.
210
Similarly, a corporate defendant's worst nightmare, showing just
why Congress is attempting to oust state courts of jurisdiction over
class actions, 211 is taking place in Florida. In the Engle case, 2 12 a
208. Richardson v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 9614505/CE212596 (Md. Cir.
Ct. Jan. 28, 1998), vacated, sub. nom., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Angeletti, 2000
Md. LEXIS 249 (Ct. App. Md. May 16, 2000).
209. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
210. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir.
1996) (reversing district court order certifying nationwide cigarette litigation
class action). Although the intermediate court of appeals in Maryland vacated
the trial court's certification order, it left open the possibility of an affirmable
certification. Moreover, the appellate court noted that mass tort class actions
may be appropriate.
211. Of course, I should not use the word "oust" because Congress is not
providing for exclusive jurisdiction. However, there is no question that most
defendants will take advantage of the opportunity to escape state courts by re-
moving cases when possible. See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Angeletti, 2000 Md.
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Florida appellate court permitted a class of Florida cigarette smokers
to proceed to a class action trial.213 In the first phase of the trial, the
jury found that the cigarettes do, in fact, cause most of the cancers
and heart diseases claimed by the plaintiffs. It also found that the de-
fendants' conduct was so egregious that punitive damages should be
awarded.214 The trial judge then ordered that in the second phase of
the trial the same jury should fix a lump sum punitive damage award
before trying the hundreds of thousands of compensatory damages
cases.215 Experts predict an award of over $300 billion.
State courts certainly have the power to certify mass tort class
actions and indeed have certified nationwide mass tort class ac-
216tions. The United States Supreme Court ruled, in Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Shutts, that so long as state class action rules provide no-
tice and opt out rights in damage cases, the state court class action
judgment can bind class members from all states.21 7 In Phillips, a
nationwide class seeking damages for back royalties was certified by
Kansas state courts and approved by the Supreme Court over a due
process challenge.
218
There is another serious potential due process problem, how-
ever. Although Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Supreme Court in
Amchem is a construction of Rule 23, her concerns over the attor-
neys' conflicts of interest and the class member conflicts of interest
implicate constitutional protections. A class action judgment is
LEXIS 249 (Ct. App. Md. May 10, 2000).
212. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).
213. See id. at 41.
214. See id. at 40.
215. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, No. 94-02797, 1999 Fla. App.
LEXIS 11937 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 1999) (vacating trial court order re-
quiring second phase of trial would be lump sum determination of punitive
damages), vacated, No. 94-02797, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 13055 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Sept. 17, 1999) (permitting second phase to proceed as ordered by trial
court).
216. See In re General Motors Corp., 134 F.3d at 139-40 (discussing Louisi-
ana state court certification in GM side saddle fuel tank litigation).
217. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985) (holding that
so long as out-of-state putative class members receive notice and an opportu-
nity to opt out of the class, they may be bound by a state damages class action).
218. See id. at 797.
1600
FEDERALISM AND MASS TORTS
binding on class members, but, under Hansberry v. Lee,2 19 only when
the class has been adequately represented. States are not free to
permit attorney conflicts that raise adequacy of representation prob-
lems that rise to the level of due process violations. While the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Amchem provides little guidance in terms
of the constitutional minimum, it is clear that state courts are not free
to bless class action settlements that fail to provide the constitutional
minimum. 22° To the extent that some members of Congress are con-
cerned with collusive class action settlements that fail to protect ab-
sent class members, it is appropriate for Congress to be concerned
with the flight of class actions to state courts. As a practical matter,
it will be difficult for many state class action settlements to be re-
viewed for due process violations by the Supreme Court in light of
the few cases the Court handles each year.
On the other hand, powerful federalism arguments can be made
that a state court is at least an appropriate forum for resolving mass
tort cases, including through class actions. After all, because mass
tort cases are essentially aggregated state products liability cases,
state courts arguably should be the primary jurisdictions to develop
the applicable standards in resolving mass tort cases. Moreover, it is
questionable whether federal courts are superior at protecting any
litigant's constitutional rights.221 This argument certainly has re-
newed force given the recent Supreme Court federalism cases.
IV. WHERE SHOULD MASS TORT CASES AND OTHER STATE CLAIM
BASED LITIGATION BE RESOLVED?
Thus, the question is whether the trend to file class actions in
state court is good or bad. Proponents of federalism should think it is
a good thing because the claims asserted in these cases arise under
state law. Many members of Congress, on the other hand, think it is
a bad thing. They have responded to the flight of class actions to
219. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
220. See Coffee, High Court, supra note 204, at B4; Anderson, supra note
204; Victor Schwartz, High Court: Class Actions and Toxic Torts Do Not Mix,
16 PRODUCT LIABILITY L. & STRATEGY No. 2, at 1 (1997).
221. See generally Rubenstein, supra note 24 (arguing that gay rights litiga-
tion experience debunks the myth that federal courts are superior to state courts
in protecting constitutional rights).
June 2000] 1601
LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 33:1559
state courts by enacting and considering legislation to permit the re-
moval of such cases to federal court, where they will be met by a
federal judiciary that Congress knows is now inhospitable to class
actions. Generally, this inhospitality will ultimately weaken plain-
tiffs' bargaining power. The history of the General Motors cases
provides an interesting example of the interrelationship of state and
federal courts, and the dynamics Congress undoubtedly is seeking to
address.
222
A. Dueling Class Actions
Federal courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with
state courts over mass tort cases in which diversity of citizenship ex-
ists. Thus, litigants have the choice of filing in either system, or
both. In the mass tort arena, before Amchem and the other restrictive
federal court of appeals decisions were decided, the federal court
handling the mass tort, usually pursuant to a transfer order by the
MDL Panel under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, was accepted as the forum for
global resolution of the mass tort. So, for example, in the GM side
saddle fuel tank litigation, the claims of GM truck owners who
sought compensation for the allegedly defective fuel tank design re-
sponsible for a high risk of fire, were transferred to the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania by the MDL Panel for pretrial purposes.2 2 3 The
district court certified a settlement class pursuant to which the class
members were to receive $1000 coupons which could be used to buy
a new GM truck within a fifteen month period, and the attorneys for
the class were to receive approximately $9.5 million in attorneys'
fees. 224 The Third Circuit vacated the class certification order and
set aside the settlement but left open the possibility that the defects
might be cured and a revised settlement approved on remand.225
222. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998).
223. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 846 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
224. See In re General Motors Corp., MDL No. 961, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18052 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 1993).
225. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 819 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. General Motors
Corp. v. French, 516 U.S. 824 (1995).
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Instead of proceeding further in the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania, however, the parties to the settlement returned to the 18th
226Judicial District for the Parish of Iberville, Louisiana, where a
similar suit had been pending in which the defendants were then op-
posing class certification, restructured their deal, and submitted it to
the Louisiana court that ultimately approved it. Before the Louisiana
court finally approved the revised settlement, which provided
slightly better terms for the class and over $26 million in attorneys'
fees, counsel for members of the class who had objected in the fed-
eral proceeding sought to derail the state proceeding by simultane-
ously removing the state court action and seeking an injunction by
the federal court under the All-Writs Act against the parties pro-
ceeding in the state court.227 The Third Circuit realized that the state
court settlement was effectively an "end run" around the jurisdiction
of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania MDL court to which the
Third Circuit had remanded the case for further proceedings. It
stated that although the procedure followed by the parties to the set-
tlement "gives us pause, the precedent of this Court and the Supreme
Court compels us to disagree" that relief is available under the All-
Writs Act.228
The Third Circuit found that no injunction could issue because
the federal district court in Pennsylvania lacked personal jurisdiction
over all non-Pennsylvania class members.229 The Third Circuit also
found that because the Louisiana court had entered a final judgrpent
on the settlement, its review was barred by both the Full Faith and
Credit Act,230 as interpreted in Matsushita Electric Industrial Com-
pany, Ltd. v. Epstein,231 and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which
prevents intermediate federal appellate review of state court deci-
sions.232 Finally, the court found that the requested injunction
226. See White v. General Motors Corp., No. 42,865 Division "D" (18th Ju-
dicial District, La.) (appeal pending).
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994).
228. In re General Motors Corp., 134 F.3d at 137.
229. See id.
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
231. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
232. See In re General Motors Corp., 134 F.3d at 138.
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did not fall under any of the three exceptions to the Anti-Injunction
Act.
233
Indeed, in the wake of Amchem, and the movement of many
mass tort class actions to state court, Matsushita takes on new im-
portance. Thus, it is instructive to focus on the Full Faith and Credit
aspect of Judge Becker's opinion in the GM case, where he stated:
The current phase in this saga recognizes the chilly recep-
tion of mass tort actions in federal courts, and has changed
the focus to state courts, either for national or statewide
classes. The class action investment engine and the defen-
dants' drive for global peace are still moving apace, but on
different tracks. Class actions rejected for trial in federal
courts are now being filed in state courts-and proposed
class action settlements rejected by federal courts are being
refiled in state courts. The United States Supreme Court
has given some momentum to this trend in Matsushita
Electric Industrial Company v. Epstein.
234
In Matsushita, the Supreme Court decided that a class action
settlement agreement releasing claims within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts was subject to § 1738, the federal Full Faith
and Credit statute.235 Judge Becker noted that Justice Ginsburg's
dissent identified serious potential due process problems in the pro-
cedures followed in the Delaware state court where the court ap-
proved the settlement. Indeed, on remand, a panel of the Ninth Cir-
cuit considered the issues raised in Justice Ginsburg's dissent and by
a two to one decision, decided, reminiscent of Amchem, that conflicts
among class counsel and the plaintiff class rendered the representa-
tion in the Delaware action inadequate. 236 In an en banc opinion,
233. 28 U.S.C. § 2283; see In re General Motors Corp., 134 F.3d at 138
(laying out the three exceptions).
234. McGovern, supra note 204, at 602 (footnotes omitted).
235. According to the Court:
The judgment of a state court in a class action is plainly the product of
a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of § 1738. Therefore, a
judgment entered in a class action, like any other judgment entered in
a state judicial proceeding, is presumptively entitled to full faith and
credit under the express terms of the Act.
Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 374 (citation omitted).
236. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn,
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however, the Ninth Circuit found that the due process issue could
not be reviewed and vacated the two to one opinion decided in the
summer of 1999.237
Judge Becker would leave it to the Louisiana appellate courts,
with ultimate appeal of due process issues to the United States Su-
preme Court, to provide the basis for analyzing the viability of the
Louisiana class settlement in the GM case. 238 As Judge Becker put
it: "If appellants are correct, the Court will be disturbed by what
Matsushita has wrought here insofar as it is said to have facilitated
an end run around the Eastern District of Pennsylvania proceed-
ings. 239
After Matsushita, seizing control of the resolution forum be-
comes increasingly important to counsel who seek a global resolu-
tion of mass tort cases. To the extent that the perception now is that
federal courts are relatively hostile, and state courts relatively more
amendable to class resolution, there will continue to be a rush to state
courts. Other issues are accelerating this trend such as the desire to
escape Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,240 the Su-
preme Court's decision making the federal district court the gate-
keeper for the admission of expert testimony. Many federal courts
have invoked Daubert to exclude plaintiffs scientific evidence,241
and the decision is viewed as a serious obstacle to plaintiffs seeking
to prove causation in many new mass tort cases.
B. What Congress is Doing
In response to the flight of state claim based class actions to
state court, because many state courts are viewed as more hospitable
to class actions then the federal courts, Congress has enacted two
statutes and is considering another. One way to prevent state courts
179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999), and cert. denied sub nom.. Epstein v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 120 S. Ct. 497 (1999).
237. See id.
238. Indeed, the appellate court in Louisiana vacated the settlement and re-
manded for findings in light of Amchem. The case is still under consideration
by the Louisiana judiciary.
239. hn re GeneralMotors Corp., 134 F.3d at 142.
240. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
241. See, e.g., Baker v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 156 F.3d 248 (1st
Cir. 1998) (using Daubert to exclude plaintiffs gynecological expert's testi-
mony and test results).
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from resolving class actions is to allow for their removal to federal
court.
First, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed into law,
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998242 which
bars most securities class actions based on state law fraud theories.
243
In the Senate, the Act was sponsored by Senator Phil Gramm, Re-
publican of Texas. The bill passed, with only two Republicans vot-
ing against it.244 While a majority of Democrats voted in favor of the
Act, they were split twenty-six to nineteen.245 Democratic members
of Congress ironically objected to the legislation on federalism
grounds.
The 1998 Act supplements the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995246 that was designed to heighten the standards for
prosecuting such actions in federal court. The 1998 Act is designed
to close a perceived loophole in the 1995 Act. Supporters of the
1998 Act believed that the 1995 Act was being undermined by the
increased filing of class actions filed in state courts based on state
law fraud theories of liability. The 1998 Act amends section 16 of
the Securities Act of 1933 and section 28 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to prohibit class actions brought by private parties based
on such theories.247 It further provides that state court class actions
brought on such theories are removable to the federal court in the
district in which the state action was filed. Moreover, it permits fed-
eral courts to stay discovery in state court actions.248
It is no secret what Congress seeks to achieve. There is no
question that Congress was well within its powers to cut back on the
federal remedies for securities violations. There also is no question
that Congress has the power to preempt state remedies, though such
power is normally exercised relatively rarely. The use of a device
like removal of cases to federal court to prevent state courts from
providing relief for state law claims rather than exercise its
242. P.L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1998)).
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1995).
247. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb (1998).
248. See id.
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preemption powers is quite unusual and novel, and raises
serious federalism problems as discussed below.
249
Congress also recently enacted a bill governing so-called Y2K
litigation. Already faced with numerous lawsuits-many of them
class actions brought in state court-members of the information
technology industry persuaded Congress, again led generally by con-
servative Republicans, to enact a bill to provide some relief from
Y2K related litigation. 250 The legislation provides certain substan-
tive and procedural standards for the resolution of these suits. Many
of these standards appear to be designed to protect the information
technology industry and those dependent upon it from claims Con-
gress perceived as essentially nuisance claims or claims with little
merit but which, if aggregated, would threaten some members of the
industry with at least the possibility of ruinous liability. Accord-
ingly, the statute limits punitive damages, imposes strict pleading re-
quirements, and provides special rules governing class actions and
jurisdiction. 1
Y2K actions may be brought in state or federal court. However,
they may be brought as class actions only if the court finds that the
defects alleged are material for a majority of the members of the
class. 2  The statute provides the standards for determining if a de-
feet is material.253 The statute also provides that the lawsuit in ques-
tion must satisfy any other prerequisites of state and federal law.
2 5 4
Given the perception that some state courts may be overly friendly to
class actions alleging Y2K related claims, the statute provides pro-
tective federal court solace for class actions. Section 6614(c) pro-
vides for original federal subject matter jurisdiction over many Y2K
actions brought as a class action.2 5 5 Of course, therefore, because
Congress has provided original jurisdiction over Y2K class actions,
they are removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 6 The importance
249. See infra Part IV.C.
250. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-6617 (1999).
251. See id. § 6614.
252. See id. § 6614(a)(2).
253. See id. § 6602(4).
254. See id. § 6614(a)(1).
255. See id. § 6614(c)(1).
256. See id. §§ 6614(c)(3)(A), (B).
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of this statute is that it provides federal jurisdiction in class actions
that otherwise would be beyond its jurisdictional reach.257
Currently under consideration by Congress is even more drastic,
general legislation. Most recently, the House of Representatives in-
troduced the Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999,258 and
the Senate introduced the Class Action Fairness Act of 1999.259
These bills would provide for expanded federal jurisdiction over
class actions in which there is minimal diversity. They would amend
257. See id. § 6614(c)(3)(A). For example, Y2K actions generally allege
violations of state law. Section 6614(c) provides federal subject matter juris-
diction for class actions of this type notwithstanding a lack of complete diver-
sity or failure to meet the jurisdictional amount rules. However, Congress did
not intend to sweep into federal court all Y2K class actions. Rather, it ex-
cepted class actions that involve relatively localized claims, or relatively few
class members, or state governments. Thus, the statute precludes original ju-
risdiction under § 6614(c)(2) if: (1) a substantial majority of the members of
the proposed plaintiff class are citizens of a single state, the primary defendants
are citizens of that same state, and the asserted claims will be governed pri-
marily by the laws of that state; (2) the primary defendants are states, state of-
ficials, or other governmental entities against whom the district courts may be
foreclosed from ordering relief; (3) the plaintiff class does not seek an award of
punitive damages, and the amount in controversy is less that the sum of $10
million (exclusive of interest and costs), computed on the basis of all claims to
be determined in the action; or (4) the proposed plaintiff class has fewer than
100 members. See id. §§ 6614(c)(2)(A)-(D). If a class action is brought in
federal court that fits within any of these exceptions, and if the sole basis for
federal jurisdiction is the Y2K jurisdictional provision and the district court
finds that the requirements for class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are not met, the district court must dismiss the action
or, if removed, strike the class allegations and remand the Y2K action to state
court. See id. § 6614(c)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
258. H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. (1999). The bill was sponsored by thirty-eight
members of Congress. Only three of the sponsors are Democrats. They all
represent districts in states-Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas-that are known
as particularly pro-plaintiff or pro-class action, or both, the exact targets of the
legislation. One of the sponsors, Rep. Virgil H. Goode, was a Democrat at the
time he sponsored the bill. He represents a district in Virginia. See id. Philip
Morris, a corporation particularly interested in escaping state courts, has its
headquarters in Virginia. Rep. Goode, known as one of the most conservative
Democratic members of Congress, subsequently withdrew from the Demo-
cratic Party to become an independent. See Eric Schmitt, Democrats Hit by a
Defection in the House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2000, at A14 (noting that on
major bills, Goode voted more often with Republicans than Democrats).
259. S. 353, 106th Cong. (1999). The bill was sponsored by two Republi-
cans and one Democrat.
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§ 1332 to allow original jurisdiction over class actions so long as any
member of the class is diverse from any defendant. 60 They further
would enact a removal provision that allows for any such case filed
as a class action in state court to be removed to federal court.261 The
purpose of these amendments is to prevent plaintiffs filing state court
class actions from preventing such cases from being removed by
naming local defendants. The bills also would allow the federal dis-
trict court to decline to exercise jurisdiction and remand when the
amount in controversy is relatively small-less than $1 million-
when class members number fewer than one hundred, when a substan-
tial number of the purported class members are citizens of the same
state as the primary defendants, or when the claims asserted would
be governed primarily by the law of the state. 62 The House ap-
proved its bill in September 1999.263
Although its passage is far from certain, it is interesting to look
at this legislation through the prism of the Supreme Court's federal-
ism decisions. Recall first that the Supreme Court in Amchem de-
cried Congress's lack of action in the mass tort arena.264 It found,
nevertheless, that federal courts were without the power to use the
procedural tool, Rule 23, to effect substantive results where Congress
has failed to act.265 The Court clearly envisioned a reduced federal
court role in the resolution of these big cases. Moreover, the Third
Circuit's analysis in the General Motors litigation, denying All-Writs
Act relief,266 opened the door for the states to resume their role in
adjudicating matters of state law in complex cases, even in the form
of class actions. So, it is ironic, if not perverse, especially in light of
the Supreme Court's federalism cases that Congress seeks to channel
these cases back to federal court where class certification now will
generally be denied. These opinions demonstrate that the federal
courts are seeking to limit themselves to a proper judicial role. At
260. See, e.g., H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. § 3(a) (1999).
261. See id. § 4(a).
262. See id. § 3(a).
263. See Stephen Labaton, House Passes Bill that Would Limit Class-Action
Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1999, at Al.
264. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997).
265. See id. at 629.
266. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 134 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 1998).
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the same time, Congress appears to be, seeking to dump its dirty
work, disempowering plaintiffs' attorneys and protecting its corpo-
rate constituents, on the federal courts.
Without the ability to obtain class certification-in state courts
because defendants will remove them and in federal courts because
of the restrictive Amchem decision-the powerful plaintiffs' bar will
lose its ability to leverage the claims of thousands of claimants to
extract large settlements from deep pocket corporate defendants. Of
course, this is the "White Knight" view of mass tort litigation. There
is no question that the mass tort settlement class action raised serious
questions about whether absent class members were receiving their
due. But, we must put aside for the moment the question whether
one thinks it is a good thing or a bad thing to swing back to a world
in which the defendant, rather than the plaintiff class, has the upper
hand in negotiations.
Indeed, there is no question that there is a role for Congress and
the courts to play in ensuring fair play to all parties. Moreover, at
first glance, there appears to be a sound constitutional basis for the
legislation under Article Ill, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.267 It
has long been understood that Congress may provide subject matter
jurisdiction based on minimal diversity. 268 The question to ask now,
however, is whether legislation that essentially ousts the state courts
from resolving mass tort and other complex state claim based class
action litigation violates the spirit or letter of the Supreme Court's
federalism decisions.
C. What Will this Supreme Court Say About the Legislation?
I will not analyze the Court's recent federalism decisions in de-
tail because they do not speak directly to the problem whether Con-
gress's class action subject matter jurisdiction statute269 is
267. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
268. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967)
(holding that complete diversity is not constitutionally required).
269. I will focus on the pending bill because it is more problematic from this
perspective. The enacted legislation involving securities cases and Y2K cases
is less problematic because Congress has not simply provided a federal forum,
but also has enacted substantive standards. As I will show below, that may
make a difference. See infra Part IV.C.
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constitutional.2 70  However, the Court's Tenth and Eleventh
Amendment cases, taken together with existing Supreme Court
precedents in the areas of protective jurisdiction, abstention, and
choice of law, provide room for arguing that this Supreme Court may
find the proposed class action legislation to be unconstitutional, not-
withstanding its apparent Article III, Section 2 basis. The holdings
of the Supreme Court cases, of course, provide no direct authority for
these arguments. But the Court's approach to the Tenth and Elev-
enth Amendments, together with language from the opinions, cer-
tainly- provide the basis for substantial, though potentially scary,
271
arguments that the legislation is problematic.
Indeed, this would not be the first time that the Court has struck
down a subject matter jurisdiction statute that on its face appears to
be proper under Article III. In Hans v. Louisiana, 2 the Supreme
Court found that a case that fell within the literal text of Article III
may not be heard. In Hans, the Court held that a citizen of Louisiana
could not sue the state of Louisiana on a federal constitutional Con-
tract Clause claim.27 3 The case clearly arose under federal law, and
thus within the federal question "arising under" jurisdiction.274 Even
though the Eleventh Amendment did not expressly prohibit such a
suit, the Court found that it was "inherent in the nature of sover-
eignty" that the state cannot be sued without its consent.275 In the
class action cases affected by the legislation, the state is not the de-
fendant, but is the target of the legislation.276 Moreover, an aspect
270. Except, of course, in the tobacco cases brought against the state dis-
cussed supra at note 15.
271. Professor Evan Caminker opined at the Symposium that the argument I
presented was "scary." I agree wholeheartedly because the import of the ar-
gument is that the power of judicial review has increased logarithmically. See
Evan H. Caminker, Private Remedies For Public Wrongs Under Section Five,
33 Loy. L.A. L. REv. (forthcoming Sept. 2000).
272. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
273. See id. at 21.
274. See id. at 14; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
275. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 13; see also Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ("[W]e have understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition..
which it confirms .... ).
276. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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of the sovereignty of the state, its dignity interest, is quite clearly im-
plicated.
1. The dignity of the state courts
There is no question that the Supreme Court's recent federalism
decisions represent a paradigm shift of the highest order. The deci-
sions are motivated in no small part by the desire to protect the dig-
nity of the states as sovereigns. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Alden
v. Maine:
The federal system established by our Constitution pre-
serves the sovereign status of the States in two ways. First,
it reserves to them a substantial portion of the Nation's pri-
mary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential
attributes inhering in that status....
Second, even as to matters within the competence of the
National Government, the constitutional design secures the
founding generation's rejection of the "concept of a central
government that would act upon and through the States" in
favor of "a system in which the State and Federal Govern-
ments would exercise concurrent authority over the peo-
ple-who were, in Hamilton's words, 'the only proper ob-
jects of government."'
277
"States," argued Justice Kennedy, "are not relegated to the role of
mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity,
though not full authority, of sovereignty.,
278
The Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment cases thus stand for
the proposition that state immunity from private suits is central to
sovereign dignity. Similarly, the Tenth Amendment cases suggest
that Congress may not commandeer state officials and impose on the
states duties to perform ministerial tasks, such as doing background
checks on purchasers of handguns.279 Such commandeering is an in-
sult to the state as sovereign. At first glance, the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendment cases appear to be inapposite to the problem of class
277. 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2247 (1999) (citing and quoting Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)).
278. Id.
279. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 898-99 (striking down Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act as in violation of the Tenth Amendment).
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action litigation between private parties. The state, of course, is not a
defendant in cases involving only private parties.280  The state
courts, of course, are not required to do anything but relinquish juris-
diction.
The crux of the legislation, however, is that state courts cannot
be trusted to fairly resolve cases brought under state law.281 In sec-
tion two, the findings section of the Interstate Class Action Jurisdic-
tion Act of 1999-the House version of the Bill-Congress finds that
"interstate class actions are the 'paradigm for Federal diversity juris-
diction because, in a constitutional sense, they implicate interstate
commerce, invite discrimination by a local State, and tend to attract
bias against business enterprises.' ' 282 A more explicit statement that
the state courts cannot be trusted would be difficult to envision. Is
that not a serious insult to the dignity of the state courts? Before the
recent decisions, it would be ludicrous to argue that Congress cannot
enact broadened diversity jurisdiction under Article III. Now, how-
ever, with the renewed emphasis on state sovereignty, the dignity of
the states and their role as co-partners in governing the people, it is
not far fetched to argue that legislation based on the findings articu-
lated in House Bill 1875 is constitutionally problematic.
Indeed, although members of Congress might say that the pur-
pose of the legislation is to provide defendants with a safer haven
from the assaults of plaintiff class action lawyers, the real target of
the legislation is the state as personified by its judiciary. In Seminole
Tribe v. Florida,283 the Supreme Court struck down federal legisla-
tion requiring the state of Florida to negotiate with Indian tribes on
gaming issues. The Indian tribes named the governor of the state as
the defendant in an attempt to evade the Eleventh Amendment.284
Nonetheless, the Court held that because the duty to negotiate ran to
the state itself, it was irrelevant who was named as defendant.
285
Similarly, although the class action legislation does not directly im-
pose a duty on state courts and does not subject them to the
280. But see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
281. See Labaton, supra note 263, at Al.
282. H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. § 2(1) (1999).
283. 517 U.S. 44,47 (1996).
284. See id. at 52.
285. See id. at 74.
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possibility of being named as defendants (unless perhaps if a state
court refused to relinquish jurisdiction), there is no direct assault on
the state. But the state's dignity interest is impaired just as surely as
if it were made a defendant. Moreover, in one sense the class action
legislation does impose a duty on the state courts: to relinquish ju-
risdiction over cases brought as class actions. For that reason, it is
suspect under the Tenth Amendment.
Two examples show the potential for a Tenth or Eleventh
Amendment violation. First, suppose the state court refuses to relin-
quish jurisdiction by continuing to issue discovery orders and the
like. The federal court to which the action was removed will un-
doubtedly enjoin the state court from proceeding.2 86 Even if only the
parties to the litigation are named in the federal court injunction or-
der, the order effectively runs to the state court itself because it bars
it from proceeding, and thus violates federalism principles. 287 The
state, as manifested by the state court judge, is now the clear target of
the federal order. A clear Eleventh Amendment problem is pre-
sented by such a scenario.
Second, suppose that plaintiffs' lawyers are adamant about filing
and keeping their class action cases in state courts. They would ap-
pear to have only one alternative. They would have to file thousands
of individual actions instead of one class action in order to obtain the
settlement leverage. This scenario presents a possible commandeer-
ing problem to the extent that these multiple filings increase the bur-
den on the state judiciary. Absent the federal class action legislation,
the parties, rather than the federal government, would determine
where the litigation would be pursued. While it is true that under the
proposed legislation the defendants must elect to remove the case to
federal court, it is obvious that this is the course most defendants will
take.
286. See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §
107.31(1), (2) (3d ed. 1999).
287. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) ("Our Federalism" rep-
resents "a system in which there is a sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government,
anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal in-
terests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with
the legitimate activities of the State.").
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I wrote at the outset of this paper that my arguments concerning
the constitutionality of the class action legislation would be quixotic.
Now, the reader sees why. It is hard to believe that the "dignity" ar-
gument outlined above would be taken seriously, especially given the
Article III basis for the proposed legislation. Given how far the ma-
jority members of the Court have gone in the recent federalism cases,
however, one wonders whether it might build on its recent decisions
and entertain arguments that Congress is overreaching. Indeed, the
Court's view on the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments may revive old
federalism arguments suggested in earlier cases that had been re-
jected as having little if any validity as a constitutional matter. It
may be scary, but not too farfetched, to think that the Court, if intel-
lectually honest, would look to these cases to extend further its new
vision of federalism.
2. Class action legislation arguably is unconstitutional
protective jurisdiction
There is no question that our federal system allows "the State
and Federal Governments [to] exercise concurrent authority over the
people." 288 One way in which the state and federal governments ex-
ercise concurrent authority is through their courts. In most cases
where Congress has provided for federal subject matter jurisdiction,
the states have concurrent jurisdiction.2 89 It is hombook law that
Congress has plenary control of the federal courts.290 This dictates
which cases the federal courts may hear so long as the case is within
the scope of jurisdiction set forth in Article III of the Constitution.
291
The problem is whether the class action legislation is a proper grant
of subject matter jurisdiction within the scope of Article III. A fed-
eralism argument can be made that it is not.
As mentioned above, it appears that the class action legislation
is patently constitutional under Article III. Article III provides for
288. Printz, 521 U.S. at 899.
289. There would be no concurrent jurisdiction if Congress provided for ex-
clusive federal subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1)(A)
(2000) ("A covered class action described in subparagraph (B) of this para-
graph that is based upon the statutory common law of the State ... may be
maintained in a State or Federal Court by a private party.").
290. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
291. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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diversity jurisdiction over cases between citizens of different
states.292 The class action legislation provides for original jurisdic-
tion and allows for removal of class actions when any proposed class
member is a citizen of a state different from any defendant. The
legislation thus requires minimal diversity. According to the Su-
preme Court, the complete diversity rule of Strawbridge v. Curtis
2 93
was merely a statutory requirement, not a constitutional one.294
Thus, legislation that permits federal jurisdiction on the basis of
minimal diversity would seem to be constitutionally sufficient.
However, if one views the class action legislation as "substan-
tive" rather than purely procedural, one may question whether it is
unconstitutional protective jurisdiction. There currently is a raging
debate about the relationship between Congress and the federal
courts in terms of the federal courts' rulemaking power under the
Rules Enabling Act.295 Borrowing from that debate, one can cobble
together an argument that the class action legislation may be uncon-
stitutional.
First, the Rules Enabling Act permits the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules of procedure subject to the caveat that such rules
"shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. ' 296 This
caveat's purpose is to prevent the courts from legislating, which, of
course, is the province of the legislative branches that are account-
able to the political process. 297 Although the rule-making process
has become politicized over the last ten years, it has been thought
that the politically insulated federal judiciary would be better at
crafting "neutral" rules of procedure. Congress, certainly, always
would be free to enact whatever substantive laws it desires within its
Article I powers.
292. U.S. CONST. art. III.
293. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
294. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
295. See generally Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (in the
Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 47 (1998) (col-
lecting cases and summarizing debate).
296. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994).
297. See Kelleher, supra note 295, at 94. ("With both the original 1934
Rules Enabling Act and its [1988 Amendment] Congress retained for itself ex-
clusive authority to make federal law that 'modifies, abridges or enlarges sub-
stantive rights."').
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Congress, of course, also has promulgated procedural rules.298
Title 28 of the United States Code contains a panoply of procedural
provisions. For example, among other things, it contains venue
statutes299 as well as, more importantly for our purposes, subject
matter jurisdiction statutes. 30 0 Most of the federal subject matter ju-
risdiction statutes parrot the language of Article III, and thus, like the
class action legislation, appear to be constitutional on their face.
Occasionally, however, Congress enacts a subject matter juris-
diction statute that does not parrot the language of Article III, Section
2. In some cases, the Supreme Court has held such statutes to be
constitutional in any event because they invariably present a federal
question. 30 ' In others, the statute passes constitutional muster be-
cause the case will be decided under federal common law.30 2 Some
of these cases, however, have been quite a stretch. For example, in
the Osborn case, Chief Justice John Marshall held a statute providing
for federal subject matter jurisdiction in any case involving the
United States Bank constitutional because threshold questions under
the federal statute creating the Bank would be an ingredient of any
case involving the Bank.30 3 The ingredient was the issue whether the
Bank had capacity to be sued, an issue that should arise only in the
first litigations involving the Bank.3 4  Rule 11 eventually would
prevent the opposing litigant from raising the issue.30 5 Nonetheless,
Justice Marshall found that because the capacity question was a
threshold ingredient of any case involving the Bank, and because
federal law would provide the answer as to whether it has that ca-
pacity, any case involving the Bank was a case arising under federal
law.
30 6
Although the Supreme Court has never embraced the doctrine,
scholars explain jurisdictional statutes like Osborn as "protective
298. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1413 (2000).
299. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1413.
300. See id. §§ 1330-1368.
301. See, e.g., Osbom v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738
(1824); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
302. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
303. See Osborn, 22 U.S. at 738.
304. Id. at 819.
305. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
306. See Osborn, 22 U.S. at 825-26.
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jurisdiction statutes. 3 °7 The theory is that because Congress prop-
erly could have enacted substantive legislation to effect whatever
substantive legislative purpose it has under Article I, it constitution-
ally may enact a subject matter jurisdiction statute that will promote
its substantive purpose without the need for substantive legislation.
To be fair, in the protective jurisdiction cases to date, the ques-
tion has been whether the statute can be saved by somehow boot-
strapping the case as a federal question case. One could argue that
there is no need for such bootstrapping in the case of the class action
legislation because it fits within the Article HI diversity jurisdiction.
However, it is not farfetched to argue that a procedural statute may
not be used to effect a substantive effect, for example effecting the
relative bargaining power of the parties on the merits of a litigation.
This is exactly what the class action legislation is designed to do. It
deprives plaintiffs of their right to pursue class relief based on state
law theories in state courts without preempting that state law or pro-
viding a federal law alternative for relief.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has cast doubt on whether such
power exists.3 °8 The Court in Mesa v. California opined that protec-
tive jurisdiction cannot be used to avoid Article III problems. 30 9 The
Court was concerned that the removal statute resulted in interference
with state prosecutions without any finding of state hostility.
310
Mesa involved an attempt to save a jurisdictional statute, the federal
officer removal statute,311 as a federal question statute. But, it may
be that just as the Mesa Court found that Congress's generalized in-
terest in providing federal officers a federal forum to be an inade-
quate justification for a jurisdictional statute, this Court would find
307. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing protective jurisdiction theory); Louise
Weinberg, The Power of Congress Over Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995
BYU L. REv. 731; Linda Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III
Jurisdiction, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 169 (1990); George D. Brown, Beyond
Pennhurst-Protective Jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Power
of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court,
71 VA. L. REV. 343 (1985); Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Ju-
risdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 542 (1983).
308. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989).
309. See id. at 137.
310. See id. at 137-38.
311. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1994).
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Congress's generalized interest in providing corporate defendants
with a federal forum to be inadequate on the similar policy grounds
of avoiding interference with state proceedings unless actual
hostility is shown, especially because the effect of the legislation is
to deprive states of their dignity interest.
3. Federalism and Erie
My "protective jurisdiction" argument is a difficult argument to
make because the statute clearly falls within the Article III, Section
Two, diversity power. Nonetheless, it can be argued that federalism
and separation of powers concerns prohibit the legislature from leg-
islating procedure when it dares not, or cannot, enact substantive
legislation, especially when the basis for subject matter jurisdiction is
diversity.312 A new federalism reading of the venerable Erie opinion
supports this claim.313
Erie stands for the basic proposition that Article III itself gives
Congress no power to provide the rule of decision in diversity
cases.3 14 If Congress seeks to do so, it must look to its Article I
power. In its class action legislation, the Senate points vaguely to
interstate commerce, but does not clearly invoke the Commerce
Clause. 315 Moreover, it purports to be offering a purely jurisdictional
statute and not any rules of decision.316 So, what is wrong with this?
First, as was made clear in United States v. Lofjez,317 there are con-
stitutional limits on Congress's ability to displace substantive state
law. Indeed, it is questionable whether Congress could enact gener-
alized substantive legislation to govern tort cases involving corpora-
tions engaged in interstate commerce. 318 Second, Congress may not
312. See Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Power and the Rules Enabling Act, 46
MERCER L. REv. 733 (1995); Linda Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking:
The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV.
1283 (1993); see also John H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary
Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REv. 276 (1928) (stating that
legislatures exceed their constitutional power when they attempt to impose ju-
diciary duty rules upon the judiciary).
313. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
314. See id.
315. See H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (findings).
316. See id. § 2(5).
317. See 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
318. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (forbidding the enact-
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use its Article HI powers to set substantive standards in diversity
cases.3 19 Third, federal courts lack the power, except in "few and re-
stricted areas,' , 32 0 to create the law to be applied in diversity cases.
Of course, it is one thing to argue that federal courts may not legis-
late. For them to do so generally violates separation of powers.
Where, however, Congress lacks the power to legislate in a particular
area, the federalism concern raised is just as fundamental a constitu-
tional problem. It follows then, that Congress may not have the
power to affect substantive state law by way of its power to regulate
procedure in federal courts in diversity cases. Ex parte McCardle
3 21
teaches that Congress is allowed to withdraw federal jurisdiction to
prevent the federal courts from resolving a substantive issue. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has also ruled that Congress cannot force
the federal courts to resolve cases in an unconstitutional manner.
322
Quite obviously and intentionally Congress's class action legis-
lation is an attempt, arguably unconstitutional, to interfere with state
regulation of mass tort and other class actions. As the bill provides
in its findings: The legislation is needed to prevent "discrimination
by a local State," and to "ensure that interstate class actions are adju-
dicated in a fair, consistent, and efficient manner."32 3 Congress is
concerned with the flight of mass tort cases to state courts, and the
increased bargaining power obtained by plaintiffs' attorneys when a
greater likelihood of class certification exists.324 Although the legis-
lation does not direct the federal courts to refuse to certify mass tort
cases-as it quite clearly could not,325 Congress is well aware that
ment of general federal tort laws).
319. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 ("There is no federal general common law.
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable
in a State . . . ."); see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 202
(1956) ("Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins indicated that Congress does not
have the constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable to contro-
versies in diversity of citizenship cases.").
320. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 518 (1988).
321. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (holding that Congress may withdraw fed-
eral jurisdiction even when its motive is to deprive the federal courts of the op-
portunity to resolve a substantive matter).
322. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (8 Wall.) 128 (1871).
323. H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. § 2(1), (5) (findings).
324. See id.
325. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (holding
that the Act requiring federal courts to vacate final judgments contravenes
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there is a diminished possibility of class certification in federal courts
after Amchem. 326 It need not enact substantive tort legislation be-
cause it can achieve its goal indirectly by ensuring that defendants be
able to remove cases when they so desire.
Congress cannot plead that the class action legislation is purely
procedural for another reason. No matter how it is characterized, it is
well understood that rules or legislation can be considered substan-
tive depending on their effect.327 For example, when a matter be-
comes the subject of controversy or is politically controversial, then
it should be treated as implicating a substantive right.
328
Additionally, the bill may not pass muster under Amchem either.
Recall that the Amchem Court was sympathetic to the goal of
achieving an efficient and fair distribution of funds to asbestos vic-
tims.329 However, the Court said the federal courts lacked the power
to grant such relief absent congressional authorization to do so as a
matter of substantive law. 330 What the Supreme Court had in mind
was substantive legislation. Allowing for more mass tort class ac-
tions to be presented to the federal courts changes not a whit the
standards for determining when class actions should be certified, nor
does it supply the basis for any substantive relief.
It appears that Congress may be aware of a potential Lopez
problem. Substantive laws enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause regulating all mass torts might not pass muster under the new
separation of powers).
326. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
327. For a discussion on the overlapping effects of procedural and substan-
tive matters, see generally Kelleher, supra note 297, at 68.
328. See Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft:
Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 842, 857 (1974) (discussing that the test for determining a substantive
right is whether it is "the subject of widespread public controversy, as differ-
entiated from controversy among lawyers"); Paul D. Carrington & Derek P.
Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegiti-
macy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 461, 482-83 (1997) ("proof of substantivity" is when a matter is "politi-
cally controversial, supported by some factions and opposed by others").
329. SeeAmchem, 521 U.S. at 597-98.
330. The district court in Amchem sought to consolidate individual asbestos
cases into a class action to be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23, but the Supreme Court ruled that Rule 23 cannot carry the large load
heaped upon it. See id. at 628-29.
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federalism. On the other hand, the Senate's findings suggest the
classic justification for diversity jurisdiction.331 However, the class
action legislation virtually ensures that the result that a plaintiff is
likely to obtain in the federal court may be different substantively
from the one the plaintiff would have received in the state court
across the street, a result that flies in the face of the Erie doctrine.
332
Indeed, the new federalism readings of the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments may revive the equal protection argument Justice
Brandeis articulated in Erie.333 He suggested that it would be a vio-
lation of equal protection if a litigant were to receive a different sub-
stantive result in the federal court than that which would be obtained
in the state court. 334 Although he appeared to be speaking in terms of
fairness to the litigants, he believed that it was unconstitutional to
deprive the litigants of the result that they would have obtained in the
state court. States clearly have the right to articulate the tort rules
governing its citizens and other persons within the state.335 While
the constitutional aspects of Erie have been attacked by scholars for
decades, 336 a new federalism reading of Erie suggests that it is un-
constitutional for the federal courts to oust the state courts of juris-
diction when the effect would be to invade the state's sovereign right
to protect or regulate its citizens.
In sum then, at least some members of Congress are trying to
protect corporate defendants engaged in interstate commerce from
the vagaries of state law by providing them with the protective juris-
diction of the federal courts. The federal courts can be trusted, while
the state courts cannot, to refuse to certify classes and thus remove
the threat of draconian, "bet your company," leverage in settlement
discussions, or worse yet, ruinous jury verdicts, like the one that may
be forthcoming in the Florida Engle tobacco class action. 337 Rather
331. See H.R. 1875, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (findings) (including the "impli-
cat[ion] of interstate commerce... discrimination by local State... [and] bias
against business enterprise").
332: See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 461-62 (1965).
333. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
334. See id.
335. See infra Part IV.C.1.
336. See, e.g., PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL STATE RELATIONS 11-14 (4th ed. 1998).
337. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, No. 94-8273, 1999 Fla. App.
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than surgically curing a problem with a laser, as the Supreme Court
requires, with significant findings justifying the operation,331 Con-
gress, with only inadequate, conclusory statements, is depriving state
courts of their ability to provide class action resolution of state
claims.
Again, Article IH appears on its face to support the grant of ju-
risdiction. It seems far fetched to argue that the Supreme Court will
require the same kind of findings as it did in cases involving the ab-
rogation of the states' sovereign immunity, such as in Kimel. How-
ever, before the recent cases, who would have thought that the Su-
preme Court would position itself as the final arbiter of whether
Congress had sufficiently supported its decision to enact legislation
under its Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 enforcement power?
The Court now requires Congress to make detailed findings as to
whether there is a constitutional problem that needs to be ad-
dressed.339 There is no language in Section 5 that sets out a standard
for when such legislation is appropriate. It merely says that Con-
gress may adopt "appropriate" legislation. 340  Similarly, there is
nothing in Article HII that suggests that the Court has the power to
review whether Congress's grants of subject matter jurisdiction are
appropriate. But we have known since Marbury v. Madison341 that
the Supreme Court will review grants of subject matter jurisdiction to
determine whether the grants comport with the Constitution. Addi-
tionally, we also know that in Marbury, the Supreme Court looked
outside of Article III to find a principle, judicial review, to
LEXIS 11937, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 1999) (vacating trial court or-
der that second phase of trial would be lump sum determination of punitive
damages), vacated, No. 94-02797, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 13055 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Sept. 17, 1999) (permitting second phase to proceed as ordered by trial
court).
338. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 645, 649-50
(2000) (holding that ADEA legislation making states amenable to suit fails
"congruence and proportionality" test, and Congress made insufficient findings
with respect to state age discrimination law to justify abrogation of sovereign
immunity).
339. See id.
340. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
341. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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determine whether the facially constitutional jurisdictional grant at
issue was unconstitutional.342
In this context, especially because of its new aggressive ap-
proach to protecting all aspects of state sovereignty, how far fetched
is it to think that this Court might now require findings to support
subject matter legislation that it views to be infringing on the dignity
and sovereignty of the states? Might not Congress be required to
justify its legislation, to the extent that it seeks to protect interstate
commerce? Under United States v. Lopez,343 Congress must show
that the harm to interstate commerce is direct, and that the legislation
does not force the federal courts to "embrace centralized govern-
ment" and "obliterate state-federal distinctions." 344 Such a showing
would be a difficult task for Congress because the Supreme Court
could view the legislation as "highly intrusive regulation in areas of
traditional state concern."
345
I do not mean to suggest that there is no merit to the legislation.
Perhaps Congress will better justify the need for the legislation.
There are many commentators who decry the abuse of class actions
by some defendants and plaintiff class action lawyers who appear to
be cutting deals to the detriment of absent class members. 346 I em-
pathize with that concern, and am accordingly sympathetic to the
proposed legislation for that reason. Possible Supreme Court review
of state class action judgments may not be enough, as Judge Becker
argued it would be in the General Motors litigation,347 to protect the
rights of absent class members. Federal judges can be provided tools
to insure that class settlements are fair. My purpose here is not to
debate the merits of the legislation, but rather to suggest that the
analysis recently developed by the Supreme Court in its federalism
342. See id.
343. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
344. Id. at 557.
345. Id. at 583.
346. See generally Rand Inst. for Civil Justice, Class Action Dilemmas: Pur-
suing Public Goals for Private Gains, Executive Summary (1999) (visited Apr.
1, 2000) <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR969.1.pdf>. See Coffee,
Class Wars, supra note 169, at 1045; Koniak, supra note 169, at 1045;
Siliciano, supra note 169, at 990.
347. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
1624
FEDERALISM AND MASS TORTS
cases raises serious questions whether such legislation is constitu-
tional. Moreover, in my view, both state and federal courts have a
proper role to play.
D. Confessions of a Nationalist, Knee Jerk Democrat-Lover of
Federal Courts
Federal court consolidation can lead to an efficient and fair
resolution of mass tort claims.348 I even argued that federal common
law should be applied349 and that All-Writs Act injunctions ought to
be ordered to prevent competing state lawsuits on the slightest
provocation of interference, especially in light of Matsushita.
35 0
Thus, my natural inclination is to support the proposed class action
legislation as a way to achieve fairness and efficiency.
However, all these writings were based on the assumption that a
mass tort actually existed. I never suggested that federal consolida-
tion was a good thing if done prematurely, meaning before we really
knew there was a mass tort. For example, I suggested in one article
that the breast implant litigation was consolidated too soon.351 The
history of that litigation shows that I was probably correct.
I maintain that we should consolidate meritorious claims, not
necessarily marginal ones. The following is an example of how mass
tort cases could proceed without doing violence to either the New or
Old Federalism. First, we seem to have lost sight of one of the justi-
fications for concurrent jurisdiction over diversity cases. State courts
ought to be the laboratories for determining whether the evidence
presented in a burgeoning mass tort is sufficient to present to juries.
Cases should proceed as individual cases, typically in state courts
which ought to have the opportunity to set standards for the various
liability, defense, and damages issues that arise in order to provide a
sense of the merit of the cases, and if there is merit, a sense of claims
values for individuals injured in different state jurisdictions.352 The
348. See Georgine, supra note 7.
349. See Multi-tort, supra note 7.
350. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
351. See Georgine, supra note 7.
352. This is the strategy being employed by some plaintiffs' lawyers in the
current Fen Phen and Redux cases. For example, Paul D. Rheingold of New
York predicted that most of the Fen Phen cases will be litigated in state courts,
and that plaintiffs will join diversity jurisdiction defeating doctors and clinics
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class action plaintiffs' bar certainly has the resources to cooperate in
developing the evidence needed, if it exists, to determine whether the
burgeoning mass tort should be aggregated or not. Delaying aggre-
gation until a credible record is developed on the question of liability
should allay concerns that proposed settlements are not fair because
the merits of the litigation are uncertain.
Indeed, it would be premature to certify a federal or nationwide
class, and attorneys for the parties ought not be settling cases in the
aggregate in either state or federal courts until there is some sense of
their value as a matter of state law. Whether a class settlement is fair
can be decided only with some negotiation and litigation of individ-
ual claims values after the substantive law with respect to a particular
mass tort has evolved and the evidence has been developed.353
While it may be proper for the MDL Panel to transfer federal actions
for pretrial purposes, as it did in February 1998 in the Fen
Phen/Redux litigation, the federal courts ought to refrain at this point
from certifying class actions for litigation or settlement purposes un-
til the general liability picture is clarified.
Once state court experience and discovery in the federal cases
show that the claims have merit, and the number of filings increase
dramatically such that individual litigation is no longer feasible,
statewide class actions filed in state court could be used to establish
the settlement value of the claims filed in that state. There ought to
be due regard for the important differences in exposure, injury, and
causation through the use of appropriate subclasses. From a federal-
ism point of view, it is just as problematic for the state courts to cer-
tify nationwide classes as it would be for federal courts, especially
given the concerns of the Supreme Court in Amchem with respect to
both the predominance of common questions and the possibility of
conflicts.
to insure that the case cannot be removed to federal court. See Bob Van Voris,
Diet Drug Suits Promise to Make Lawyers Fat, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 22, 1997, at
A7. His prediction appears to be accurate. While there is a federal $3.75 bil-
lion settlement, see Bob Van Voris, Fen-Phen Legal Battle Opens, NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 31, 2000, at A14, one of the first post-settlement cases will be tried in a
Massachusetts state court. Moreover, seven thousand plaintiffs have, and
many other plaintiffs may, opt out of the settlement. See Joseph P. Fried, More
Litigation Ahead on Diet Drug Despite Proposed Class Action, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 2000, at A23.
353. See Georgine, supra note 7.
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Finally, after several state class action settlements have been ap-
proved, and the various plaintiffs' lawyers and defense lawyers in-
volved think it appropriate to achieve a global resolution, the federal
court would be the appropriate forum for facilitating a settlement.
Differences in state law would matter less at this point because the
prior state court adjudications and class action settlements have es-
tablished a meaningful sense of the value of the claims alleged. Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court's concerns about adequacy of repre-
sentation can be tested against the historical settlement values
already obtained in the state courts. In sum, it is best to leave it to
the courts, state and federal, to decide the appropriate approach to re-
solving mass torts and other complex state claim based litigation.
3 5 4
V. CONCLUSION
State courts and federal courts must remain partners in seeking
the fair and efficient resolution of mass tort cases. Each jurisdiction
has an important role to play in insuring that proper standards are ap-
plied and a global resolution is achieved with a minimum of cost and
delay. Congress should not enact the class action litigation. It vio-
lates both the New and Old federalism and will not promote the fair
and just adjudication of state claim based class resolution.
354. See Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 169.
June 2000] 1627
1628 LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 33:1559
